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STATEMENT OF ISSUES and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether at all pertinent times Appellant lawfully possessed the liquid morphine? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error and or Substantial Evidence Test, §63-
46b-4(d), (g) - "interpretation" is subject to a correction of error standard of 
review and is not "merely an exercise of implicitly delegated discretion to interpret 
or apply the law, reviewed under subsection (4) (h) (i)." 
Stems from post trial DOPL Order 
2. Whether a traveling home health nurse can temporarily safeguard prescribed but 
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unneeded morphine at his home? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error, §63-46b-4(d) - and is not "merely an 
exercise of implicitly delegated discretion to interpret or apply the law, reviewed 
under subsection (4) (h) (i)." 
Stems from post trial DOPL Order 
3. Whether a patient's daughter and son-in-law have a "right of possession" to a lethal 
volume of a Schedule II controlled substance - liquid IV morphine - legally in the 
possession and control of appellant as administering nurse, prescribed by a physician for 
administration by the appellant nurse to the patient 'prn' - on an as needed basis - where 
the physician ordered appellant nurse "that's a hell of a lot of morphine" and "be careful 
with that" and where no need for the morphine existed after the prescription was legally 
filled? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error, §63-46b-4(d) 
Stems from post trial DOPL Order 
4. Whether Count I of DOPL's Petition should be dismissed for lack of evidence? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error and or Substantial Evidence Test, §63-
46b-4(d), (g) 
Stems from post trial DOPL Order 
5. Whether it is error and or illegal for DOPL and Commerce to order "delivery" of 
physical possession of a lethal volume and concentration of liquid morphine to non-
patient family members in violation of statutes and contrary to its own Controlled 
Substances Act Rule -R156-37-502(4)? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error §63-46b-4(d) ~ "interpretation" is 
subject to a correction of error standard of review and is not "merely an exercise of 
implicitly delegated discretion to interpret or apply the law, reviewed under 
subsection (4) (h) (i)." 
Stems from post trial DOPL Order 
6. Whether DOPL and Commerce have authority to order a nurse to violate a narcotic's 
rule and statutes and thereby force him to commit criminal and unethical acts? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error, §63-46b-4(b), (d), (e) — 
"interpretation" is subject to a correction of error standard of review and is not 
"merely an exercise of implicitly delegated discretion to interpret or apply the law, 
reviewed under subsection (4) (h) (i)." 
Stems from post trial DOPL Order 
7. Whether Appellant made timely objections to nurse Baker testifying? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error, §63-46b-4(d) 
vii 
See Exhibit 2 with transcript citations to objections 
8. Whether Appellant's 4 objections to nurse Baker's lack of qualifications as expert 
witness should have been sustained and the testimony disallowed or disregarded? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error, §63-46b-4(d) 
See Exhibit 2 with transcript citations to objections 
9. Whether Baker's testimony is "personal opinion" not expert testimony - as admitted 
by DOPL? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error, §63-46b-4(d) 
See Exhibit 2 with transcript citations to objections 
10. Whether nurse Baker's incompetent testimony failed to establish a standard of care 
requiring "delivery" of schedule II controlled substances to a patient's family? morphine? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error §63-46b-4(d); (possibly also Substantial 
Evidence Test, under §63-46b-4(g) 
See Exhibit 2 with transcript citations to objections 
11. Whether nurse Baker's testimony constitutes substantial evidence? 
Standard of Review: Substantial Evidence Test, §63-46b-4(g) 
See Exhibit 2 with transcript citations to objections 
12. Whether all Department of Commerce's findings and conclusions are in error which 
rely on the finding and conclusion that nurse Baker's testimony established a nursing 
standard of care for handling of a lethal quantity of liquid morphine? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error and Substantial Evidence Test, §63-46b-
4(d), (g) 
See Exhibit 2 with transcript citations to objections 
13. Whether Jepson committed theft or a taking and whether Count III should be 
dismissed? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error and or Substantial Evidence Test, §63-
46b-4(d) 
Stems from post trial DOPL Order 
14. Whether the prosecution met its burden of proof at trial on Counts I and III, filed 
against Appellant? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error, §63-46b-4(d) 
Written Motion to Dismiss, Record p. 248-260 
15. Whether DOPL's post trial substantive change to Utah Controlled Substance Act 
vili 
Rule R156-37-502(4) and its retrospective application to appellant, making, without 
warning, his lawful legal possession of a controlled substance ipso facto unlawful, 
illegal, and unprofessional, and DOPL's application of the change to a "class of persons" 
(e.g. home health nurses) without compliance with the Utah Administrative Rule Making 
Act, is error and illegal, is beyond the jurisdiction conferred by statute, is an unlawful 
procedure or decision-making process, or fails to follow prescribed procedure, or is not 
supported by substantial evidence, or is contrary to the evidence? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error and possibly in part Substantial Evidence 
Test, §63-46b-4((a), (b), (d), (e) (g?) - "interpretation" is subject to a correction 
of error standard of review and is not "merely an exercise of implicitly delegated 
discretion to interpret or apply the law, reviewed under subsection (4) (h) (i)." 
Stems from post trial DOPL Order 
16. Whether DOPL's actions constitute illegal, unconstitutional or ex post facto conduct? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error, §63-46b-4(a), (d), (e) 
Stems from post trial DOPL Order 
17. ISSUE: Whether DOPL must comply with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act 
in making substantive changes to Controlled Substances Act Rules, and whether failure to 
do so is a usurpation of exclusive legislative authority? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error, §63-46b-4(a), (d), (e) 
Stems from post trial DOPL Order 
18. Whether DOPL's trial judge wrongfully excluded relevant evidence affecting the 
right of appellant to present the national standard for the security of Schedule II narcotics 
in home health care of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
organizations, "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence?" 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error, §63-46b-4(d) 
Presented Exhibit before 2nd day of Trial, see trial discussion - MT 52:16-56:17 
19. Whether the trial Judge's false assurance to defense counsel that Board would not 
find a "taking" or "theft" caused failure to object? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error, §63-46b-4(d);; Substantial Evidence 
Test, §63-46b-4(g) 
Plain Error-Manifest Injustice - Objections made out of hearing of Jury and off the 
record - and Judge made an assurance and a curative Jury Instruction 
20. Whether the ordered reprimand should be vacated? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error, §63-46b-4 (d) 
ix 
Stems from post trial DOPL Order 
21. Whether the requirement of disclosure regarding a "Private reprimand" is reasonable 
or appropriate? 
Standard of Review: Substantial Evidence Test, §63-46b-4 (g) 
Stems from post trial, Dept Of Commerce Order on Review 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U.S. Constitution, Article 1, §10 states: No State shall...pass any Bill of Attainder, 
ex post facto Law... 
Statement of the Case Citation are to April Transcript (AT), May Transcript (MT) 
1. The Nature of the Case (including facts and citations to trial transcript) 
Appellant, Scott Jepson, RN, ("Jepson"), was an "A" student in nursing school, 
had the highest ACT score in his entering class, "was an excellent excellent student," "an 
excellent nurse," and had "above average" patient assessment skills (Dr. Roger Badger, 
MD [Dr. Badger] AT 180: 21-181:9; Nursing Professor Instructor Teemant [Teemant]: 
MT 130:19-131:6). He is a specialized and very experienced nationally certified critical 
care nurse (CCRN) (MT 45: 11-20). He has an unblemished record (DOPL Order, p. 13, 
lines 2-3). He has experience in hospital neo-natal intensive care (ICU), and pediatric 
nursing, and extensive experience in adult ICU and coronary care (CCU) nursing. While 
working for First Choice Home Health many cardiovascular patients were referred from 
the Hospital Cardiology Unit because Jepson was an employee there. (Jepson: AT 
222:20-225:2; Dr. Badger AT 148:14-15). He has years of specialized training in federal 
DEA and state statutes, rules, regulations, and patient advocacy (MT 24:19-25:17; 53:15-
-1-
16; 54:8-12; 81:23-25; AT 148:12-15; 191:12-192:8) As an ICU, CCU, and CCRN he has 
extensive specialized experience in the handling, control, and administration of liquid 
intravenous morphine. In April 2002 he was temporarily working as a traveling home 
health care nurse (AT 223:18-19). He has since returned to work as a hospital ICU CCU 
nurse. 
This entire case centers around Jepson's proper and legal handling and control of a 
$26.00 single-multi-use vial containing a "shocking" (Dr . Badger AT 150:25) and 
"lethal"(see Addendum Exhibit 12 for 37 references) amount of 300 mg of liquid 
intravenous morphine, highly concentrated in a 20 ml solution [15 mg/ml] (hereafter 
"Morphine" or "IV Morphine")(MT 14:21-15:22), prescribed and requiring complex 
administration (Dr. Badger AT 178:6-7) "as needed" for a very debilitated 89 year old 
patient (Mortensen). This was the only Morphine available on the evening of April 11, 
2002, when a valid prescription was issued to Scott Jepson (herein after "Jepson") (with a 
warning from the Doctor "be careful with this") for administration to the patient on a 
"prn" basis, which means, "only as needed." Complex administration means the 
administration of this concentration of Morphine requires skill and experience beyond 
that of the average nurse, and far beyond a lay patient or family member. If wrongfully 
administered it is fatal. This quantity of morphine is 75-150 times the average dose of 2-4 
mg. It is also 10 times the total amount of 30 mg of Morphine, originally prescribed by 
the same Doctor's office earlier the same evening but which prescription could not be 
filled. The average dose of morphine is 2-4 mg (Teemant: MT 105:23; Jepson AT 231:6-
-2-
7; MT 11:4-6), an amount difficult or impossible for the average nurse, lacking 
specialized experience and training (let alone for a lay person), to calculate and draw 
from the above described multi-use vial, since syringes are marked in milliliters, not 
milligrams (Dr. Badger AT 151:11-13; Jepson: MT 80:6-10; Teemant: 105:7 - 106:23) . 
This explains why one of the most common mistakes in medicine is the mis-
administration of liquid morphine (Dr. Badger: AT 151:11-16; Dr. John Frischknecht, 
MD [Dr. Frischknecht]: AT 194: 24-195:11; Jepson: MT 33:3-6; Dr Eric Hogensen [Dr. 
Hogensen]: MT 158:8-11). 
The uncontested evidence showed the morphine was never needed nor 
administered due to the immediate and miraculous recovery of the patient (AT 31:1-8; 
247:8-18). (Conclusions, 10:13-14). After it was determined that the morphine was not 
needed, and after obtaining a required witness, Jepson wasted the morphine in accord 
with standard nursing practice and in accord with the standard 72 hour narcotic 
discontinuance rule (Teemant: MT 112:8-113:16; Jepson: MT 63:10-66:4). (Findings, 
5:14-15). The violation of any "unlawful conduct" provision of Title 58 is a crime (Class 
"A" misdemeanor - §58-1-502 UCA). Jepson was familiar with these statutes and Rule 
502(4) and obeyed and followed them. 
The Judge/Board post-trial illegally and "substantively changed" Utah Controlled 
Substances Act Rule (UCSAR) R-156-37-502(4)(hereafter "502(4)" or "Rule") without 
compliance with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act and unconstitutionally imposed 
the changed Rule Ex Post Facto against Jepson's actions of a year prior. The rule 
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requires the administering nurse to maintain effective control of the morphine. Jepson 
obeyed the Rule and the Board concluded he should have violated it, based on their 
change, so they concluded his non-violation was a theft. The Judge also allowed a 
prosecution witness, Nurse Baker, to testify over six (6) defense objections to her 
qualification. Admissible exhibit evidence was wrongfully excluded by Judge Eklund. 
2. The Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial before DOPL (with citations) 
A Petition (Exhibit 17, Record, p. 348) was filed against Jepson with DOPL on or 
about July 5, 2002. Trial was held before DOPL on April 25, 2003 and again on May 30, 
2003. Administrative Law Judge Steve Eklund sat as trial Judge (hereafter "Judge") and 8 
female members of the Utah State Nursing Board sat as a jury (hereafter "Board"). The 
Judge sat with the Board in deliberations following trial - part two, and drafted the 
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommended Order (hereafter and heretofore called 
"Findings" or "Conclusions" or "Order" - Exhibit 18). The Petition charged Jepson with 
violations of seven statutes and one Rule as set forth in Exhibits lb and lc. 
The prosecution failed to prove any violation of Rule 502(4) or Counts II & IV, 
resulting in the dismissal of Counts II and IV and in the Conclusion that Jepson fully 
complied with Rule R156-37-502(4) UCSAR (hereafter "Rule 502(4) or "Rule") (i.e. he 
maintained effective control of the Morphine)(See Conclusions: 11:11-13, 24-26; 10:13-
27; 11:1-4;). The dismissal of Counts II and IV dismissed all allegations against Jepson 
for wasting the Morphine without a witness and without documentation and of violating 
-4-
Rule 502(4). 
Despite the dismissal aforesaid, antithetic conclusions were reached and included 
by DOPL in its final Order concerning the 1) the wasting witness's competency, 2) 
documentation, and 3) possession-at-home issues of Counts II and IV. 
3. Statement of Facts: All facts cited above and below are incorporated herein by this 
reference. The facts relevant to Counts I and III are stated here. The facts relative to the 
three challenged conclusions are stated in the discussion of them below. Jepson was 
working for First Choice Home Health as a traveling home nurse. On Thursday, April 11, 
2002 Jepson was assigned to fill in for another nurse in visiting and caring for Mortensen, 
who was living with Beckstroms (AT 225:3-226:9). He visited the patient three times in 
three days, 300% more than any prior nurse (MT 145:14-24), from April 11, through 13. 
Upon examination, Jepson found this extremely debilitated patient with a decreased level 
of consciousness.1 After lengthy conference with Beckstroms, and their declination to 
move Mortensen to the hospital, Jepson called Dr. Hogensen, the patient's primary care 
physician (AT 228:13-229:21). Dr Hogensen prescribed a Duragesic Patchs and liquid 
morphine (30mg - 3x10 unit dose vials) (AT 229:22-231:2; 234:20-235:14). Jepson went 
1
 obtunded, had significant gargling, wasn't swallowing, and had lost gag reflex, 
with significant right sided hemiparesis with paralysis of the upper right arm and paresis 
of the lower extremity. He also knew that she suffered with multiple compression 
fractures in her spine, multiple meaning most of them had fractures in them, severe 
osteoporosis, pain in her shoulder and her right arm. He knew she had a real reason to 
have real significant pain if her level of consciousness started to increase. (AT 225:3-
228:12; 234:20-235:14). 
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with Garth Beckstrom (Garth), in Garth's car and picked up the two prescriptions from 
Dr. Hogenson's office and then went to a Shopko pharmacy. The pharmacy filled the 
prescription for the patches and gave the patches directly to Garth. The pharmacy did not 
have the unit-dose vials. Jepson then called numerous pharmacies and the morphine 
prescription could not be filled. C&S and B&H Pharmacies only had a multi-dose vial 
contained 300 milligrams of morphine in a 20 milliliter solution - 15 milligrams per 
milliliter. It was ten times the amount Dr. Hogenson originally prescribed (MT 11:18-
12:4; AT 231:4-240:25; MT 134:11-137:22). 
Garth asked and Jepson inquired and determined the cost to be $26.00. Then Garth 
drove home, kept the patches, and gave Jepson $26.00 to pay for the morphine and 
supplies (AT 239:14-240:3). Jepson got out of Garth's vehicle and went back to Dr. 
Hogenson's office. He was gone. Dr. Rose was covering for Hogenson. Dr. Rose came 
out, wrote a prescription for the available larger 300mg multi-dose vial and handed it to 
Jepson, saying, "that's a hell of a lot of morphine." As Jepson started to walk away, Dr. 
Rose said to him, "be careful with that." These two statement were Dr. Rose's orders to 
Jepson concerning the morphine. Jepson went to B&H Pharmacy where Jeff Fisher the 
pharmacist filled the prescription. He arrived about 7 pm.(AT 236:18-238:20). Jepson left 
the pharmacy about 8 o'clock p.m. He called Garth (AT 240:25-245:9). Mortensen's 
condition had improved. Garth told Jepson he had been trying to call him and said, "if 
you haven't filled the prescription, don't" and "We don't think we want the morphine 
anymore. We don't think she needs the morphine" (Jepson: AT 241:5-8; 243:12-17; 
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MT 92:10-25; Garth: MT 144:14-15; Karen: AT 31:9-16; 35:16-17). Jepson checked 
his cell phone and found that Garth had made no calls to him (AT 241:18). Garth testified 
that he could not remember (MT 138:15-16). Before the second day of trial, Jepson 
obtained a copy of his cell phone records and verified that he had called and spoken with 
Garth (MT 168:8-169:12). Jepson affirmatively testified at trial about his call to and 
conversation with Garth and Garth's lack of memory does not negate Jepson's testimony. 
Therefore, Jepson's testimony was undisputed at trial. Jepson emphasized to Garth that if 
Mortensen woke up in the night and was having pain, please call him on his cell phone 
and he would come right over and set up the IV and administer the liquid intravenous 
morphine to Mortensen, no matter what time of the night. He made sure Beckstroms 
knew that he and the morphine were available, that he was keeping control of the 
morphine, and that they could call him at any time. He gave Beckstroms his cell phone 
and beeper numbers (AT 241:4-242:10; 243:6-244:10; 245:13-246:1). Jepson then 
drove to his home where the morphine was secured in his home under lock and key, 
according to Jepson's understanding and training and in compliance with Rule 502(4). 
This was the only location where Jepson could secure and safeguard the morphine 
through the night and still keep it available to administer if the need arose (MT50:18-
51:10) 
The need never arose. The Duragesic patches were never administered (AT 29:19-
21). No call from the patient or Beckstroms came during the night (AT 246:3-9). As of 
the first day of trial (Apr 25, 2003) a year later, there had been no need for the morphine 
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because Mortensen had "stayed pretty much the same" (Karen: AT 37:10-15). The next 
morning, Friday, April 12, Jepson called Beckstroms to check on Mortensen. He was told 
by Karen, "It's almost a miracle, She just seems like a miracle to us. She is up. She is 
eating. She has already had breakfast" and had taken her oral pain pills. Jepson asked 
specifically about what medications she had taken. He went by the Beckstrom home late 
morning to verify what Beckstroms had told him (AT 246:9-248:2; MT 6-7:14). He had 
no reason to disbelieve Beckstroms' report (AT 248:3-8). He had no reason to believe the 
morphine was needed and hence left it secured at his home. Jepson concluded the IV 
morphine order/prescription was no longer relevant and was held or rescinded at that time 
to be wasted, since it could not be administered without need, nor in addition to the oral 
medication. Jepson took time to educate Beckstroms about the fact, he was not allowed to 
distribute the 300mgs of liquid morphine which was in his control for the sole purpose of 
administration to Karen's mother, Mortensen. Jepson came again on Saturday the 13th. 
Mortensen continued to be improved (AT 221-248:11; MT 6-93:13). Jepson proceeded 
that day or the next day to waste the morphine, as soon as he could obtain a witness, 
which was Jack Branin, who came to Jepson's home (MT 49:8-50:9). 
4. Summary of the Argument 
The Petition contained poorly drafted antithetic allegations - which means, in this 
case, Jepson was charged with opposites. Reduced to its simplest but accurate factual 
form, Jepson was charged on one hand with failing to maintain effective control of the 
lethal quantity of Morphine (in violation of Rule 502(4) - Count IV) — an allegation 
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proven false at trial — and on the other hand with failing to relinquish control by way of 
failing to "distribute" and "deliver" (criminal acts) the Morphine to Beckstroms. 
The following may seem like a play on words, but it is not. It is factual. DOPL 
charged Jepson with violating Rule 502(4), then found him not guilty, then substantively 
changed the Rule, post trial, and found him guilty for being not guilty. Stated differently, 
they charged him with a violation, found he committed no violation, then changed the 
Rule and found he should have committed the violation with which they originally 
charged him. And, because he didn't commit the violation, they labeled his non-violation 
an unlawful possession and a theft or taking. All of this DOPL did, even though they 
dismissed both Counts II and IV, which contained the underlying charging language and 
Rule 502(4), and even though it presented no evidence, let alone substantial evidence, to 
prove any of the charges or elements of the 7 statutes or Rule pleaded in the petition 
against Jepson. A summary of the prosecution's case-in-chief is attached as Exhibit 7 and 
shows there was no proof of violation by Jepson of any statute or Rule. The prosecution 
witnesses didn't even mention the charging language under any Count, nor the elements 
of any of the Statutes or Rule, cited in the petition. Not only did the prosecution utterly 
fail in its burden of proof, but Jepson affirmatively proved, charge by charge, element by 
element, with typed copies in the hands of each Board/Jury member, and overwhelming 
evidence, that he did not violate, but rather meticulously adhered to and obeyed every 
statute and rule he was charged with violating. The four defense medical witnesses were 
all expert in the handling, control and administration of liquid IV morphine, whereas the 
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prosecution's only (case-in-chief) medical witness admitted she had no "exposure" to nor 
"experience" with liquid IV morphine. She was no expert at all. 
Stated differently, DOPL changed Jepson's legal lawfully-compliant 
patient/family-protective acts of maintaining effective control under Rule 502(4) and 
refusing to unlawfully and criminally "distribute" by "delivering" the morphine to 
Beckstroms (in violation of 58-1-502, 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), and 58-37-2(l)(n), UCA) into 
unlawful and unprofessional conduct by substantively changing Rule 502(4) so as to 
suspend the duty to maintain control, ordered "delivery" of the morphine, applyed it 
retrospectively, and concluded that since Jepson kept control of, rather than"delivering," 
the morphine to Beckstroms, he unlawfully possessed the morphine and was guilty of 
theft or a legal taking. In short, Jepson obeyed the law and DOPL concluded he should 
have broken the law. A Bizarre conclusion. 
DOPL had no authority to substantively change the Rule (limiting it to institutions 
and suspending its application to a class of persons - home health nurses), without 
following the legal procedure mandated by the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Even if it had such authority under any analysis, it cannot change statutes that prohibit 
"distribution" and "delivery" of controlled substances. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This entire case can and should be disposed of in favor of Appellant Jepson based 
on any one or more of five (5) different analyses set out below. The related issues will be 
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set forth and answered at the end of each Analysis. Jepson seeks dismissal of DOPL 
Petition Counts I and III and vacation of reprimand and several findings/conclusions. 
FIRST ANALYSIS 
Statutorily Prohibited "Delivery" vs. DOPL Ordered "Delivery" 
of schedule II controlled substances 
This analysis begins with a careful reading of six statutes and one rule. These 
statutes and rule are or should be dispositive of this case. Please turn to Addendum 
Exhibit 1 and read them before continuing. Other statutes and cases are cited hereafter. 
DOPL found and concluded that Jepson should have "delivered" the morphine to 
Beckstroms, and then Ordered Jepson to "deliver" physical possession of all Controlled 
Substances into patient's homes in the future. Said findings and conclusions regarding 
"delivery" are illegal and the Order to do so in the future is also illegal and requires 
Jepson, and perhaps other administering home nurses, to unlawfully "distribute" and 
"deliver" - which is a crime. Let's analyze this. 
The DOPL Petition (Addendum Exhibit 14) Counts I, III, and IV are related. 
Count I charges unlawfully possessing the morphine, Count III charges "failed to 
produce2 a medication ... for a patient," and Count IV charges failing to maintain 
effective control of it after legal possession was obtained. The uncontested evidence 
proves Jepson obtained legal possession of the morphine, produced and kept it available3, 
2
 See Addendum Exhibit 13 - Definitions 
3
 See Addendum Exhibit 13 - Definitions 
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and maintained effective control of it. The word "produce" is not in the statutes cited 
under Count III. 
Count I: DOPL found Jepson lawfully obtained the morphine (Conclusions 9:24). 
The uncontested evidence support this. He complied with every element of §58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (Addendum Exhibit 1; MT 7:17-12:20). The other two statutes cited (§58-3 lb-
502(5) & §58-l-501(2)(a)) (see Exhibit IB) do not stand alone but rise or fall with proof 
of §58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Nevertheless, Petition Count I, which alleges violation of §58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) was not dismissed. The prosecution presented no evidence to support Count I 
(see Exhibit 7-summary of Prosecution's case-in-chief with transcript citations). Jepson's 
testimony was uncontested, undisputed, and unimpeached. There was no evidence, 
certainly no substantial evidence supporting Count I. It should be dismissed. 
Count HI: Compliance with §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) constitutes "producing" a 
medication "for a patient." By the aforesaid actions, Jepson did "produce" (Exhibit 13) 
the morphine for the patient and kept it constantly under lock and key, but "available" 
(Exhibit 13) for administration to Mortensen, even for a couple of days after it was 
determined the morphine was unneeded. DOPL through its prosecutors chose and 
pleaded the word "produce" and based it upon §58-3 lb-502(7) - the "taking" statute, but 
utterly and totally failed to present any evidence or prove any of the elements of theft or 
of a legal taking (Addendum Exhibit 7 and Analysis 3 below). The evidence proved just 
the opposite, that Jepson lawfully obtained and exercised authorized control over the 
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property not belonging to another4 without a purpose to deprive5 Mortensen of it, but 
rather with the very purpose or intent to "administer" it to Mortensen "as needed" in strict 
accord with the Doctor Rose's orders and instructions (see Facts) and the law. Neither 
Karen, Tiernan, nor Baker testified about any of the elements of theft. However, the 
prosecution's pleading of the "taking" statute (§58-31b-502(7), Unprofessional conduct 
includes (7) unauthorized taking or personal use of a patient's personal property) 
intended "theft" as evidenced by Prosecutor Cheryl Luke's closing argument, "...was that 
a theft..." (MT 190: 5; and Exhibit 7 - summary). Jepson affirmatively proved, element by 
element, that he complied strictly and completely with all legal requirements and practice 
standards (MT 8:13-93:16 -Count I p 8; Count II p 14; Count III p 36; Count IV p 45). 
There was no evidence, certainly no substantial evidence, supporting Count III. It should 
be dismissed. 
Count IV: After obtaining legal possession, Jepson maintained effective control 
of the morphine as required by Rule 502(4). In order to have proven a violation of Rule 
502(4), DOPL/Prosecution had to prove that Jepson's actions were not effective against 
"diversion, theft, or shortage." The prosecution presented no evidence that there was any 
"diversion, theft, or shortage" of the morphine(Exhibit 7), hence Jepson's actions were 
effective, and DOPL/Board found Jepson did not violate Rule 502(4) (conclusions 
4
 See Addendum Exhibit 9 - Jury Instruction given to Board/Jury regarding 
ownership of a narcotic. 
5
 See Addendum Exhibit 14 - DOPL & Commerce findings as to Jepson's "intent" 
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11:14-15). Therefore DOPL dismissed Petition Count IV. 
Count II & IV: Count II alleged failure to administer, failed to report suspicion. 
Counts II & IV both alleged - disposed of narcotic without a proper witness, or witness, 
and maintained narcotic at home. DOPL/Board concluded Jepson "inappropriately" and 
without "good judgment" maintained morphine at his home. Having the morphine in his 
home was not in itself a violation by Jepson of any statute, rule, or order, as found and 
concluded by DOPL.6 It was only a violation in the mind of the DOPL Board because 
taking it home to maintain effective control was not "delivery" to Beckstroms, hence the 
wording: Respondent violated the applicable standard of care BECAUSE he failed to duly 
deliver that medication to the Beckstroms (p. 10, % 1, lines 4-5) [emphasis added]. Since 
Counts II and IV were dismissed, so too should the conclusion, based thereon, be 
dismissed and not remain to support a reprimand. This result was argued by DOPL and 
adopted by ALJ Medcalf on appeal to Commerce on two other conclusions - see next 
paragraph. It should apply here. 
Count II & IV: Both these counts alleged Jepson wasted morphine without a 
"witness"or "competent witness." Neither count pleaded, nor did any statute cited 
therein mention, "documentation." Nevertheless, Prosecution at trial questioned about 
documentation of the wasting of the morphine. Jepson testified, and Prosecutor Luke 
6
 " Respondent inappropriately kept the morphine sulphate at his home. . 
.However, the Board finds and concludes that such conduct - standing alone - fails to 
establish a violation of §58-l-502(2)(g) . . . (Order, 11:5-9; Record, p. 191:5-9) 
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admitted, that Jepson's employer never supplied a narcotic waste sheet for documentation 
by witness signature (undisputed fact)(MT 24:18-28:2; 46:20-47:4; 129:12-130:3). 
Baker testified she hadn't reviewed and "didn't know" whether Jepson documented the 
wasting on the Oasis 485 medication sheet (AT 120:2-121:2). Neither Prosecution nor 
Baker produced that sheet, although they were mysteriously able to produce the rest of 
the Oasis recertification. Strange, huh? The only crucial evidentiary sheet missing 
(Record pp 208-230)? Jepson testified he did document the wasting on the Oasis 
medication sheet. His testimony was thus undisputed. In sustaining Jepson's objection 
about that line of questioning, the Judge ruled that "documentation" "is not an issue 
before the Board" (AT 106:19-20). Both counts II and IV were dismissed. Despite that, 
DOPL/Board concluded Jepson wasted the morphine "without a competent witness and 
any documentation" (Conclusions p 11:6-7). There was no evidence, let alone substantial 
evidence to support that conclusion. How could there be a conclusion on a point that was 
ruled "not an issue" before the Board? Jepson challenged both conclusions on appeal to 
Commerce (Record p 113-118). DOPL argued in response that both conclusions were 
"totally irrelevant at this point in time, because Count IV of the Petition ...was dismissed" 
(DOPL Response Brief 18:1-5, dated Feb. 13, 2003; Record p 90:1-5). ALJ Medcalf 
agreed with DOPL's argument and ruled that the Board' 5 aforesaid two conclusions were 
"not relevant" and "harmless error" (Order, 18:11-21, at 17,21). Jepson requests now 
that the aforesaid three conclusions be stricken and vacated since they are not supported 
by any, let alone, substantial evidence. 
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Delivery: There is no evidence for and Jepson did not "distribute" nor "deliver." 
He did not "agree, consent, offer, arrange" nor "intend" to "distribute" or "deliver" the 
morphine. He did not "produce, manufacture, or dispense," nor "possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance" all in the sense 
meant by 58-37-8(l)(a)(i). Now let's compare the law to the actions of DOPL and 
Commerce. 
DOPL's Conduct: DOPL's and Commerce's allegations, findings, conclusions, 
and Order are so disparate and incommensurable with the narcotic's statutory and rule 
framework (Exhibit 1) as to constitute its antithesis. "Produce" does not mean "deliver" 
(Exhibit 13) by any stretch of the imagination. Neither is "deliver" a synonym for 
"produce," yet, bear in mind, Jepson was charged with "failed to produce...for a 
patient." DOPL concluded, post trial, that the Petition wording "possessed outside his 
responsibilities," and "failed to produce...for a patient" (Counts I & III, respectively) 
both mean Jepson "failed to deliver" physical possession of the morphine to the 
Beckstroms (see quotes below) (Conclusions, 10:4-5). They then transmuted that 
conclusion into a conclusion that he stole the morphine because he did not "deliver." 
Their wording was that he "took" it (see 3rd Analysis below). 
An examination of DOPL's language (DOPL Order (Exhibit 18, Record pp 180-
194) leads to the inescapable conclusion that it failed to understand and therefore failed 
to follow statutory law and Rules passed by our Legislature. Please look at DOPL's 
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language. As you will see, DOPL's entire focus was on "delivery:" 
failed to duly deliver that medication to the Beckstroms (Conclusions, p. 
10, line 5); rather than deliver that medication to the Beckstroms. 
(Conclusions p. 12, lines 2-3); ...medication should have been available at 
the Beckstrom 's home... (Conclusions P. 12, lines 4-5); should have 
delivered that medication to the Beckstroms... (see Conclusions p. 12, lines 
13-14); [emphasis added] 
Respondent [Jepson] lawfully obtained the morphine... (Conclusionsp. 9 
line 24) ...he unlawfully possessed that prescribed controlled substance in 
his home and he failed to deliver that medication to the Beckstrom's home 
(p. 9y last paragraph, last three lines). Respondent also engaged in 
unprofessional conduct — violative of§58~31b-502(7) — when he took7 Ms. 
Mortensen 's prescribed medication and possessed the morphine sulphate in 
his home. Respondent violated the applicable standard of care BECAUSE he 
failed to duly deliver that medication to the Beckstroms (p. 10, ^ 1, lines 4-
5); Respondent failed to exercise good judgment when he elected to retain 
the morphine sulphate in his home rather than deliver that medication tji 
the Beckstroms (p. 12, lines 1-3); ...Jie should have delivered that 
medication to the Beckstorms and Respondent failed to do so in his zealous 
attempts to obtain and then exclusively control access to that medication (p. 
12, \ 2, lines 13-16) . [emphasis added] (Exhibit 18, Record pp 180-194) 
Another problem with DOPL's conclusions about "delivery" is the glaring fact that 
the prosecution never even mentioned, let alone proved, any standard of care (see 
Exhibits 5 & 7), especially not about "delivery." They couldn't, because "delivery" is 
illegal and it's criminal. 
Please don't be misled by DOPL's misuse of the words "took" and "available" in 
the above quotes (see 3rd analysis below). Jepson had legal possession from the 
pharmacist in accord with §58-37-8(2)(a)(i). He never "took," "stole," or "removed" 
7
 Addendum Exhibit 13 - Definitions of Took, Take, & Taking 
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anything from the possession of the patient or patient's family. As the reader can see, the 
entire thought process of DOPL was so narrowly, even fanatically (albeit illegally), 
focused on "delivery" they overlooked the fact that "delivery" of IV morphine by an 
administering nurse is a crime. It is prohibited by statute. Jepson knew this and he obeyed 
the law and did not "deliver" but kept the morphine "available" for administration - which 
never became necessary (see 3rd Analysis below). Nevertheless, DOPL Ordered Jepson: 
Respondent shall abstain from such conduct in the future and assure that 
medications prescribed for any of his patients in a home health care setting 
are maintained in their home for administration to the patient as may be 
warranted, [emphasis added] 
"Maintained in their home" means Jepson, and other home health nurses, charged 
with administration of schedule II narcotics, cannot obey the statutes and rules by 
maintaining effective control required by Rule 502(4), §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), and §58-37-
2(1 )(n) but rather shall break the law and commit crimes by "delivering" narcotics to the 
patient's home, relinquishing effective control of them, and leaving them with the family, 
consistent with DOPL's Order. This meaning is clear from the findings and conclusions 
that precede the Order(quoted above). The only problem with such an Order is that it is 
illegal, contrary to statutes, and requires Jepson, and perhaps other administering home 
nurses, to commit future crimes. This Order of DOPL creates a new crime or class of 
crimes which "creation" is an illegal usurpation of exclusive legislative power (Exhibit 
ID). 
DOPL Changed Rule 502(4) without authority so it could Order Delivery: On 
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appeal to Commerce, Jepson argued that DOPL changed Rule 502(4) when it declared, 
"R156-37-502(4) does not apply strictly in a home health care setting. . . " and 
"Wherefore, it is ordered that Respondent be publicly reprimanded. . ." [emphasis added] 
He argued the change was illegal and creates a precedent at DOPL and sets the stage for 
the nursing Board to illegally impose this illegal standard upon all administering home 
health nurses in Utah, thus requiring every one of them to commit crimes as well. ALJ 
Medcalf therefore changed the ordered public reprimand to a private reprimand with a 
requirement for Jepson to publish it, in a transparent effort to avoid the "precedent" 
Jepson argued. Her effort fails because it did not remedy DOPL's illegal conduct of 
changing the Rule without compliance with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act 
(§63-46a-3, 4) nor does it remedy the illegal order requiring Jepson to commit future 
crimes by "distributing" through "delivery" of narcotics It also fails to prohibit DOPL 
from using this case as a precedent by making it into an exception to Rule 502(4) (§63-
46a-3 (8)(b)). That would mean that every wasting of unneeded or unused morphine 
(and other schedule II drugs) by every administering home nurse every day in Utah is a 
crime because of failure to "deliver" the morphine to the patient or patient's family in 
accord with DOPL's Order and its change to Rule 502(4). DOPL's Rule change is a 
dramatic, and unwarranted departure from the intent of the legislature in passing the 
aforementioned controlled substances statutes and rules. Now, the Related Issues and 
answers. 
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1. ISSUE: Whether at all pertinent times Appellant lawfully possessed the liquid 
morphine? 
Ans: Yes. He complied with every element of §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and thereafter 
with every element of Rule 502(4), as written, and did not violate 76-6-404 (theft) nor 
58-31b-502(7) (taking). DOPL illegally changed Rule 502(4) and concluded "delivery" 
was what they required. "Delivery" is an unlawful "distribution under §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) 
and §58-37-2(l)(n). By its conduct DOPL created a new class of crimes - an illegal 
usurpation of exclusive legislative authority. Prosecution presented no evidence to the 
contrary. Count I and III should be dismissed and the reprimand based thereon vacated. 
2. ISSUE: Whether a traveling home health nurse can temporarily safeguard 
prescribed but unneeded morphine at his home? 
Ans: Yes. The prosecution offered no competent testimony, statute, rule, nor order 
prohibiting such conduct. Jepson was required by Rule 502(4) to maintain control and all 
the expert testimony at trial by all medical witnesses, except Baker, demonstrated that the 
standard of practice and care for a lethal volume of liquid IV morphine was to never 
deliver it into the possession of the patient. 
3. ISSUE: Whether a patient's daughter and son-in-law have a "right of possession" 
to a lethal volume of a Schedule II controlled substance - liquid IV morphine - legally 
in the possession and control of appellant as administering nurse, prescribed by a 
physician for administration by the appellant nurse to the patient 4prn' - on an as 
needed basis - where the physician ordered appellant nurse "that's a hell of a lot of 
morphine" and "be careful with that" and where no need for the morphine existed 
after the prescription was legally filled? 
Ans: No. Beckstrom's name was not on the morphine prescription. They had no 
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intent nor training to administer it. It was a lethal volume and concentration. It was illegal 
for Jepson to have "delivered" it into their physical possession. It was illegal for the 
pharmacist to have dispensed it to them since its quantity (300 mg) exceeded by ten times 
the original prescription (30 mg) intended for the patient, and exceeded the amount 
needed for a 72 hour period (MT 85:18-86:3; 86:25-87:4; 106:19-20). Last, the Jury 
instruction given by the trial Judge set the demarcation line between ownership and non-
ownership of a schedule II controlled substance by a patient as "possession" (Exhibit 9; 
Jury Instruction supported by expert testimony - MT 116:3-24). There is no "right of 
possession" since the framework of the narcotic's laws and rules requires of 
administering nurses strict controls of narcotics and wasting of unneeded narcotics. The 
nurse is not allowed to just hand the narcotic over to the patient concerning which the 
nurse is charged with administering. It is easy to understand. The patient can pick up any 
narcotic directly from the pharmacist (not 300 mg of morphine), but if it's an IV narcotic, 
then the nurse cannot administer it or take it (MT 81:25-83:3; 116:3-24). The 
administering nurse must obtain the IV narcotic direct from the pharmacist and maintain 
control of it (please read §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) carefully and notice the wording "directly 
from a practitioner.") Practitioner is defined in §58-37-2(ee) as a "physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, pharmacist..." If the patient picks it up from the pharmacist, then the nurse 
cannot 'take' it from the patient's possession, cannot administer it, and therefore cannot 
maintain effective control of it. Neither can the nurse leave it with the patient or family 
and maintain effective control of it. The nurse must obtain it direct from the pharmacist, 
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administer it as needed, maintain control of it until it is unneeded, then waste it. The 
defense evidence was overwhelming, the prosecution evidence nil (Exhibit 7). 
4. ISSUE: Whether Count I of DOPL's Petition should be dismissed for lack of 
evidence? 
Ans: Yes. Not only did the prosecution fail to prove Count I, but Jepson 
overwhelmingly disproved it. Jepson was in legal possession at all times. 
5. ISSUE: Whether it is error and or illegal for DOPL and Commerce to order 
"delivery" of physical possession of a lethal volume and concentration of liquid 
morphine to non-patient family members in violation of statutes and contrary to its 
own Controlled Substances Act Rule -Rl56-37-502(4)? 
Ans: Yes. It is reversible error and illegal for DOPL to order a nurse to "deliver" 
schedule II controlled substances into the physical possession of non-patient family 
members. Even if DOPL could change Rule 502(4) without complying with the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act (§63-46a-3(2)(c), (3), (4)(d), (6), (7)(a)(i),(b), (8)(b)), 
which it cannot, it cannot change statutes (§58-1-502, §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), and 58-37-
2(1 )(n)) which make "delivery" of a controlled substance unlawful and criminal. Such an 
Order is not "merely an exercise of implicitly delegated discretion to interpret or apply 
the law (Semeco Industries, Inc v. Tax Comm 'n, 849 P.2d 1167). 
6. ISSUE: Whether DOPL and Commerce have authority to order a nurse to 
violate a narcotic's rule and statutes and thereby force him to commit criminal and 
unethical acts? 
Ans: No. No one has authority to order another to commit a crime. Doing so is 
itself a crime. DOPL's order requires Jepson and perhaps other nurses to commit future 
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crimes by unlawfully distributing and delivering controlled substances to non-patient 
family members. DOPL has no such authority and certainly nothing to support such 
claimed authority was presented by the prosecution at trial (Exhibit 7). 
SECOND ANALYSIS 
Nurse Baker's Testimony Should be Stricken 
due to Lack of Foundation & Qualifications, Timely Objections, 
Incompetence, and because It Advocates Illegal and Criminal Conduct 
and is Insubstantial in Light of the Whole Record 
In its case in chief DOPL called Nurse Baker as its only medical witness. Baker 
did not interview Jepson. The prosecution failed to show Baker had any knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, education (702 URE) or specialization {Burton Rule, infra) in 
the handling, control and administration of liquid morphine - the central issue of this case 
and the area of Jepson's specially and experience. Neither did she have knowledge of the 
applicable Controlled Substances Act and Rules or Title 58 statutes, as evidenced by the 
testimony she gave which advocated illegal and criminal conduct contrary to statutes and 
Rule 502(4) (e.g. "distribution" and "delivery" to non-patients of controlled substances in 
the legal possession of the administering nurse). Baker only read through some medical 
records and testified. No foundation was laid for, and Baker was not qualified by the 
prosecution as (1) one of two possible forms of a lay witness,8 or (2) as an expert witness 
under Rule 702, URE, concerning handling and control of liquid morphine. Rather the 
8
 Evidentiary Foundations, 3 ed., Imwinkelried, Edward J., The Michie Co. Law 
Publishers, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1995, pp. 241-246; See Addendum Exhibit 6 
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opposite - She testified that she had no "exposure" to nor "experience" "in administration 
or control of IV morphine" (see Addendum, Exhibit 3; see also AT 118:25-119:17). She 
disqualified herself as an expert for this trial. She was allowed to testify over five (5) 
initial objections and one final objection by the defense as to her lack of qualifications 
(see Addendum, exhibit 2; AT 98:24-100:17; 136:3-5). She testified only by way of her 
personal opinion as to what she would have done or thought Jepson should have done -
i.e. "delivered" the morphine to the Beckstroms (see Addendum, Exhibit 4). She 
advocated "delivery" of a controlled substance by an administering nurse. She testified 
about handling liquid IV morphine, something she knew nothing about — her testimony 
was pure guesswork, misled the Board/Jury, caused confusion of the issues, and created 
unfair prejudice to Jepson, all in violation of Rule 403 URE. 
Baker's testimony did not meet the standard for an expert medical witness as set 
and required by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Burton v Youngblood, 111 P.2d 
245 (Utah 1985). The Burton Court held that one specialized Plastic Surgeon witness 
could not testify against another General Plastic Surgeon defendant who performed a 
specialized procedure within the area of practice of the witness doctor, unless the proper 
foundation was first laid, even though the witness was otherwise qualified. The 
foundation must be laid. The Burton Court said, "this rule makes good sense. . . we 
follow it here." In contrast, Baker was not qualified nor was the required foundation laid 
for her testimony - and on top of that, she disqualified herself (see below). 
The Burton Rule was affirmed by this Utah Appellate Court in Anton v. Thomas, 
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806 P 2d 744 (Utah App. 1991) wherein the Court upheld the trial court's exclusion of an 
expert witness stating, "Admission of expert testimony requires proper foundation to 
qualify the witness." 
Again in the case of Robb v. Anderton 863 P 2d 1322, 920770-CA (Ut. App. 
1993) this Court upheld the Burton Rule and the trial court's allowance of an out-of-state 
Doctor being qualified as an expert because the proper foundation was laid at trial 
showing he had written books and articles about the subject, had practiced in that area, 
and had "personally administered anesthesia to thousands of children." The case 
involved a question about the administration of anesthesia to a child. The Anton and 
Robb Courts reviewed trial Judges' rulings which followed the Burton rule. 
In Dikeou v Osborn, 881 P2d 943 (Utah App. 1994) this Court held: 
The trial court is given discretion under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence 'to determine the admissibility of expert testimony, and to 
determine if the [expert] witness is qualified to give an opinion on a 
particular matter.' " Robb v. Anderton, 863 P 2d 1322, 1326 (Utah App. 
1993) (quoting Anton v. Thomas, 806 P. 2d 744, 746 (Utah App. 1991)) In 
exercising that discretion, we believe a trial court should require a 
medical expert witness to demonstrate familiarity with the applicable 
standard of care based on more than just a review of the documents in 
the particular case. See Arnold, 846 P. 2d at 13 10; Youngblood, 711 P.2d 
at 248. By definition, an expert is one who possesses a significant depth 
and breadth of knowledge on a given subject. To allow a doctor in one 
specialty, retained as an expert witness, to become an "expert" on the 
standard of care in a different medical specialty by merely reading and 
studying the documents in a given case invites confusion, error, and a trial 
fraught with unreliable testimony. See Nielsen, 763 p.2d at 822 ("[W]e 
think it is sound policy to limit expert testimony in medical malpractice 
cases to that which is within the doctor's specific field of practice."). 
[emphasis added] 
-25-
It appears to us that the Utah Supreme court's rationale underlying the 
Youngblood and Arnold decisions...is to assure that relevant expert 
medical testimony given to establish the applicable standard of care 
maintains a high degree of reliability, thereby avoiding confusion for a 
jury, [emphasis added] 
This Dikeou rule applies, or should apply, to a nursing case like this one, where 
unprofessional conduct is alleged, not unlike in a malpractice case. It should apply to 
nurse testifying against nurse, where Jepson has specialized knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, education, specialization, expertise, experience, and practice and is involved in 
an unusual circumstance9 with a lethal volume and concentration of liquid IV morphine, 
and the adverse witness (Baker) has no such knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
education, specialization, expertise, experience, ox practice, by her own admission. The 
trial Judge in the instant case violated the Burton rule and this Dikeou rule. Judge 
Eklund ruled Nurse Baker could testify and then the basis of her testimony could be 
examined, and "then he would allow" the testimony. He never ruled she was accepted by 
the Court as an Expert Witness (Exhibit 2 and AT 100:6-8), as he did with the defense 
witnesses. At the end of her testimony there was a 6th Objection which the Judge ignored. 
He failed to make his promised ruling or any ruling on 1) the Objections, 2) whether the 
testimony was being allowed and 3) whether Baker was accepted as an Expert Witness, 
even though the basis of her testimony had been examined and found to be glaringly 
9
 Order, "isolated incident" 12:24; "rather unique facts of this case" 13:6; Jepson, 
AT 129:6; MT 91:12-92:2; Frischknecht, AT 191:12-192:6; 194:13-15; 194:20-195:23; 
TeemantMT 125:4-6; 
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wanting and not in conformity with the Burton rule. Judge Eklund violated the Burton 
Rule, and Rules 403 and 702 URE. He abused his discretion. He allowed the Board/Jury 
to hear Baker, which was, or should be, reversible error, and Baker's testimony should be 
disallowed and stricken. 
DOPL, through Karl Perry (Perry), admitted in its Memo, p. 17 lines 11-14, 
Record p 89), that Baker offered only her own personal opinion and that such was all 
that was elicited from her. This personal opinion testimony does not meet the standards of 
Rule 702 UR,E nor does it meet the generally accepted standard for expert testimony, nor 
does it meet the Utah-adopted Frye standards for expert opinion testimony. The ultimate 
issue in this case goes to the area of Jepson's specialized knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, and education - the handling, control, and administration of liquid IV morphine. 
Furthermore, MUJI 6.22 states in pertinent part [emphasis added]: 
The amount of caution and attention required in the exercise of a nurse's 
duty is measured by the patient's condition, the danger involved in the 
treatment.. .the information and instructions given the nurse by the 
attending physician or surgeon^ and other surrounding circumstances. 
Prosecution witness, Dr. Rose, told Jepson, "That's a hell of a lot of morphine," 
and "Be careful with that" (AT 237:12-238:20; MT 12 5-15; 121:23-122:9)." Although 
Prosecution witness, Dr Hogenson, testified that he regularly prescribes morphine "pills" 
which he thought ought to be kept in the patient's home, he also testified that he never 
prescribes for use in home health a lethal 300 mg / 20 ml high-concentration single-
multidose vial because it is different than pills from "an administration standpoint, risk 
-27-
standpoint" and is "usually kept elsewhere... it's not convenient... and a nurse has to 
administer it" (MT 156:7-157:19). Isn't that something? Jepson obeyed the instructions 
from Dr. Rose to "be careful" with the morphine, and also acted like Dr. Hogenson 
testified, by "keeping" the lethal volume of morphine "elsewhere," other than at the 
patient's home. Neither of these prosecution witnesses refuted anything Jepson or other 
defense witnesses testified to during trial, even though, as prosecution rebuttal witnesses, 
they had every opportunity to do so. Now let's compare Baker's testimony to the 
testimony of the four defense medical witnesses, for substantiality, in light of the whole 
record. There is no way to put into this brief the full content nor overwhelming import of 
the Defense witnesses' testimonies. But the reader can get a feel for it, as follows. 
The first crucial comparison is that the Court never ruled that Baker was an 
expert. Dr. Badger, Dr. Frischknecht, and Nursing Professor Teemant were all offered by 
Jepson as, and each was accepted by the Trial Court and the prosecution as, an "Expert 
Witness" as to all the issues at trial. All, except Baker, testified they had extensive 
experience with liquid IV morphine (Badger - AT 146:17-147:12; Frischknecht - AT 190: 
1-19; Teemant: MT 94:9-104:5, see esp. pp. 103:22 and 104:3-5). 
Nurse Baker was never "offered" by the prosecution as an "Expert Witness" (see 
AT 90-98:24) but was "offered" as an Expert by the Trial Judge (see AT 99:3-14), after 
defense objections, under the condition precedent that the basis of her testimony could be 
examined, and then he would allow her testimony (AT 100:6-8; see also Exhibit 2, for 6 
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identified objections and transcript citations). 
A second comparison examines whether the witnesses' testimonies referred to the 
elements of the charging language and supporting citations in the petition, which the 
prosecution had to prove with a preponderance of the evidence. Baker's testimony did not 
contain one word, not one scintilla, of evidence about the required elements of proof and 
the handling of liquid morphine (Exhibits 7 & 8). Baker never so much as mentioned 
Petition Counts I or Ill's charging language or citations (trial testimony AT pp 90-142; 
summary of her testimony Exhibit 7; List of Elements and Prosecution's Burden of 
Proof, Exhibit 8). 
Baker did talk about: 
her background; charting concerns by nurses; duty to educate patient and 
caregiver; wasting of narcotics; documenting (which the Judge ruled was 
not an issue at trial - AT p 106, lines 19-21); Oasis recertification 
medication sheets; that "if a medication is ordered for a patient it should be 
left in their home;" but that "you wouldn't leave it there if it wasn't a safe 
situation;" that she had no exposure to nor experience with liquid IV 
morphine; she didn't know whether Jepson documented the morphine on 
the Oasis medication sheet; testified opposite to the wording of the 
reporting statute, the language of which was read by her; that if the 
morphine were left in a home the administering nurse would have no way to 
control the theft of the morphine; couldn't answer any questions about unit 
dose vials of morphine; answered numerous speculative questions put to her 
by the prosecution; that there should be a witness to a wasting; that a 
witness cannot sign a non-existent wasting form; and that she had not 
reviewed any material from First Choice. (See summary, Exhibit 7) 
None of her testimony proved any of the required elements of the seven (7) 
statutes or of a violation of Rule 502(4) under which Jepson had been charged, let alone 
the 3 statutes under Count I or the one statute under Count III (Exhibit 8). 
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Dr. Badger, on the other hand testified about his expertise with and the handling 
of liquid morphine. (Apr Tran pp 142-186; see esp p 143, lines 14-25; p 146, lines 7-23; 
p 147, lines 1-10). Dr. Bager testified that the 300 mg/20 ml lethal IV Morphine quantity 
was a shocking amount and should not have been left in the patient's home and that 
Jepson did the correct thing by maintaining effective control of it. He even said he would 
forbid it (AT 147-158; 152:9-10; 165:11-167:10; 168:6-12; 169:13-17; 170:7-10,20-
24; 171:21-173:1; 176:15-177:12; 178:5-8). 
Dr . Frischknecht testified that nurses are under obligation, the same as doctors, 
to "do no harm" to patients (AT 192:7-19). He also testified that there is increased risk to 
patients if a 300 mg vial is left with untrained persons (AT 195:21-23). He also testified 
about the dangers of leaving such a quantity of Morphine in a family home (AT 196:14-
198:20; 199:14-18). Finally he testified that it would create an unreasonable risk of 
potential harm or even death, to leave such a volume in a concentrated dosage in a 
family home (AT 202:19-25). 
The defense expert, nursing instructor Teemant, with 33 years experience (MT 
95:3-4) and familiarity with the "standards of nursing" (MT 102:20-24) who taught both 
Jepson and Baker in nursing school, testified what the state and national standards were 
and that Jepson's conduct complied with the law and nursing standards regarding the 
lethal volume and concentration of liquid IV morphine, that IV narcotics are never 
delivered to a patient according to state and national nursing standards, and that, having 
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reviewed Baker's trial testimony, Baker was incompetent to testify in this trial (MT 
107:10-110:18; 112:8-113:16). She testified that, in the case of Mortensen, she had read 
over Jepson's April Trial Transcript and listened to his in-court May testimony and found 
Jepson complied with the appropriate standards of nursing practice and care and "did the 
right thing" (MT 104: 18-25). Further, she testified there was nothing that led her to 
believe to a reasonable degree of nursing certainty that Jepson did not act, at all times and 
in all matters and with regard to the issues surrounding Hazel Mortensen's care, in a 
professional manner as a prudent practitioner (MT 109:9-17). She described the 
difficulties of Morphine and older patients and the difficulties of administering the 
correct dose from a 300 mg/20ml vial of Morphine, especially for family members, and 
even for nurses untrained and inexperienced with IV Morphine administration (MT 
105:7-106:23). She testified to the unreasonable risk of harm presented to a family and 
patient and the nurse by bringing into a home and delivering into the possession of the 
patient or family the "toxic, lethal dose" in this case; the required assessment skills that 
family members and even non-ICU-trained nurses lack; and to the requirement of wasting 
the IV Morphine if not used (MT 109:23-112:22; 114:3-116:2). 
She also testified to the 72 hour discontinuance rule for narcotics, and that a 
narcotic is not kept for future needs and that this nursing practice standard is accepted 
throughout Utah and the Nation (MT 112: 4-114:1) This uncontested testimony 
disproved the illegal theory of the prosecution and the Board about keeping liquid 
Morphine for future needs. She testified about Count IK and the "taking" allegation and 
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that Jepson did not "take" the Morphine but rather complied with accepted nursing 
practice of maintaining effective control and not delivering it to the patient or family (MT 
116:3-24). 
Jepson's testimony dealt in agonizing detail with every single element of every 
single statute and Rule 502(4) as well as with the very wording of the charging language 
in Counts I and III (MT 8:13-93:16 -Count I p 8; Count II p 14; Count III p 36; Count IV 
p 45). None of his testimony was rebutted, contested, or disputed in any way (see AT 
221>end; MT pp 6-93). Furthermore, the testimonies of Dr. Badger, Dr. Frischknecht, 
and Nursing professor Teemant all supported Jepson's and countered Baker's testimony. 
Even the three prosecution rebuttal witnesses, Garth, Dr. Hogensen, and Dr. Rose 
supported Jepson's testimony. 
For the above reasons, Jepson's six (6) trial Objections should be sustained, the 
Judge's rulings on them reversed, Nurse Baker's entire testimony stricken and 
disregarded as unqualified non-expert lay-personal-opinion - not expert opinion -
testimony inadmissible at trial. This Court should also hold that Baker's testimony did not 
constitute "substantial evidence" in light of the whole record and that the findings and 
conclusions of DOPL's nursing Board/Jury, which are based exclusively on the Baker 
testimony, should be reversed, Counts I and III dismissed, and Jepson's record cleared. 
In summary as to Count I:, There is no competent evidence in support of Count 
I, let alone, substantial evidence. Failure by the prosecution to prove the required 
elements of §58-37-8(2)(a) (i), §58-3 lb-502(5), and §58-1-501(2) UCA prevents the 
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conclusion that Jepson "possessed controlled substances outside of his responsibilities as 
a nurse" and requires, under the correction of error standard of review, the dismissal of 
Count I. 
In summary as to Count III: Not only did the prosecution fail its burden of proof 
that a theft or legal taking happened, let alone present substantial evidence, but the actual 
evidence at trial, including the Jury instruction on narcotic ownership, proved there was 
no theft or taking and that Jepson's conduct was legal from start to finish. Count III 
should be dismissed and Jepson's record ordered cleared. Let's look at the issues. 
7. ISSUE: Whether Appellant made timely objections to nurse Baker testifying? 
Ans: Yes. 6 Objections. See Exhibit 2 
8. ISSUE: Whether Appellant's 4 objections to nurse Baker's lack of 
qualifications as expert witness should have been sustained and the testimony 
disallowed or disregarded? 
Ans: Yes. For all of the reasons set out in the first and second analyses. 
9. ISSUE: Whether Baker's testimony is "personal opinion" not expert testimony -
as admitted by DOPL? 
Ans: Yes. Admitted by DOPL. See Exhibit 4. No foundation laid. Not questions 
asked about any specific standard or standards of care. None identified. No testimony 
about nursing industry-wide acceptance or practice on any point. (Exhibit 7 - summary) 
10. ISSUE: Whether nurse Baker's incompetent testimony failed to establish a 
standard of care requiring "delivery" of schedule II controlled substances to a 
patient's family? 
Ans: Yes. Baker's testimony failed to establish any standard, let alone a standard 
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requiring "delivery" to a patient's family. There were only 4 "standards" questions put to 
her (see Exhibit 5). She never answered the first, and the other three were her personal 
opinion about wasting narcotics. 
11. ISSUE: Whether nurse Baker's testimony constitutes substantial evidence? 
Ans: No it does not. She is not an expert on liquid morphine and was not accepted 
by the Court as an Expert and was objected to by the defense. Her personal opinion 
testimony advocated illegal and criminal "distribution" and "delivery" of schedule II 
controlled substances contrary to Utah Statutes and Rule. Her testimony was incompetent 
and unqualified. She disqualified herself. Therefore her personal opinions cannot 
constitute substantial evidence. Four other medical witnesses testified just the opposite 
from her and all were qualified and three of them were expressly accepted by the Court 
and prosecution as experts as to all issues at trial. 
12. ISSUE: Whether all Department of Commerce's findings and conclusions are in 
error which rely on the finding and conclusion that nurse Baker's testimony 
established a nursing standard of care for handling of a lethal quantity of liquid 
morphine? 
Ans: Yes. For all the reasons above. 
Third Analysis - Theft or Taking 
"Produce" "Took," "taking," and "available" have been defined above. The 
elements of theft are set out in Exhibit 1. 
With respect to element 1, DOPL concluded Jepson "obtained" the morphine 
lawfully (Exhibit 18; Conclusions 9:24; Record p. 189:24). With respect to element 4, it 
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also found and concluded that Jepson had "good intent" and Commerce concluded that 
his intent was to obey the law (Exhibit 14). This leaves only elements 2 and 3. Neither 
Karen, nor Tiernan or Baker testified Jepson exercised "unauthorized control" or that the 
morphine "belonged to another" - i.e. Mortensen, rather DOPL found Jepson lawfully 
obtained the morphine... (Conclusionsp. 9 line 24) . In this quasi-criminal case, Jepson 
was charged with "failed to Produce...for a patient" based upon §58-3 lb-502(7) (Exhibit 
1). A violation of this section is a crime. Jepson "produced" the morphine as shown in 
Analysis One above. There was no proof offered by the prosecution of personal use by 
Jepson nor does the Petition allege such. The only part of the statutory language left is 
"unauthorized taking ...of a patient's personal property" 
Nowhere in the trial transcript can be found even one scintilla of evidence that the 
morphine was owned by or belonged to Mortensen. To the contrary, Judge Eklund gave a 
Jury Instruction to the Board to the opposite effect,10 that ownership by the patient does 
not exist until it is in the patient's physical possession. There is nothing in the DOPL 
Order that mentions any basis for or that it disregarded that instruction, which was given 
based upon the defense evidence presented during trial.11 DOPL never filed a cross-
10
 See Addendum Exhibit 9 
11
 Judge Eklund: First of all there have been cases in the past where instruction 
have been provided to boards as a consequence of the evidence offered during the 
hearing. Because there is precedence for doing it, it could be done in this case. (M T, 
p. 197, lines 1-5) [emphasis added] The clear implication is that the Judge thought there 
was ample evidence offered by the Defense during the trial to supported the Instruction, 
and there was. 
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appeal challenging that instruction. The instruction is therefore controlling in this case. 
Mortensen was never in physical possession of the morphine. A prescription, like the one 
in the instant case, for administration by a nurse "as needed," is not a bill of sale or 
conveyance of title nor order to "deliver" physical possession of the drug and its 
container to the patient. It is nothing more than a medical order to a nurse to administer 
the prescribed drug to the patient - if and as needed. The Utah Supreme Court has 
declared: And the State must prove substantially as charged the offense it relies upon 
for conviction. The judgment must stand or fall upon the proof or lack 
thereof of the crime with which the State charged the defendant, essayed to 
prove, and of which he stands convicted... State v. Taylor, 378 P.2d 352, 14 
Utah 2nd 107 (Utah 1963). 
There was no evidence presented by the prosecution to support a conclusion of 
"unauthorized taking" by Jepson, nor to support a conclusion that the morphine was the 
"patient's personal property." I challenge DOPL to point out such evidence in its 
response brief, if exists. Not only is there no substantial evidence to support DOPL's 
findings and conclusions of a taking and hence of unlawful possession, but there is no 
evidence at all (see Addendum Exhibit 7). Jepson has marshaled the evidence, 
summarized the Prosecution case in chief and found no evidence in support of DOPL's 
errant-illegal conclusion. Therefore, DOPL and Commerce should have concluded, and 
this Court should now conclude and rule that DOPL did not meet its burden of proof of 
theft or a taking, and there is no evidence, and certainly no substantial evidence, in light 
of the whole record, to support a conclusion of theft or taking, or of Count III, and Count 
III should therefore be dismissed, together with all findings and conclusions contrary to 
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this Courts ruling. 
Both DOPL and Commerce specifically found, respectively, that Jepson had 
"good intentions" and "At all times, his intentions were to comply with the law and the 
standard of care for home health nurses, not to violate them" (Exhibit 14). Our Supreme 
Court declared about intent: 
There is, of course, no question about the proposition: if the defendant took 
the property under an honest but mistaken belief that he was entitled to do 
so, that would negative his intent to steal; and he would not be guilty of 
theft; State vKazda, 545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976) 
It is clear from the facts as testified to by Beckstroms and Jepson that from April 
11, 2002 forward , Jepson has claimed he was bound by law not to make an illegal 
distribution and delivery of controlled substances. Right or wrong, although he was right, 
this belief negatives any intent to steal and he cannot be found guilty of theft or taking. 
This coupled with the fact that Jepson never "took" any thing, is the final nail in the 
"unlawful conduct'Vtheft conclusion's coffin. Count III must be dismissed. Furthermore, 
Case law on theft reveals that proof of theft requires more than an administrative 
substantive rule change applied retrospectively.12 Now the related issues: 
13. Whether Jepson committed a theft or taking and whether Count III should be 
12
 State v. Allen, it is necessary to find intent to steal; State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 
1228 (Utah 1980) - theft requires evidence that the property was taken from the 
possession of the owner; State v. Hollen, 1999 Ut App 123, 982 P.2d 90 removal of 
money was a taking; 
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dismissed? 
Ans: No. Jepson committed no theft or taking. There was no prosecution 
evidence whatsoever to prove the elements of theft. Yes, Count III should be dismissed. 
14. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution met its burden of proof at trial on Counts I 
and III, filed against Appellant? 
Ans: No. The prosecution proved none of the Petition allegations and none of the 
elements of the statutes and Rule cited in the petition. None of the prosecution witnesses 
even discussed the petition allegations or the required elements of proof. The only thing 
that was discussed by the prosecution that was tangible was Jepson's failure to "deliver" 
the morphine to Beckstroms, which of course would have been illegal. 
Fourth Analysis - Ex Post Facto Conduct of DOPL 
The United States Constitution Article 1 Section 10, states: No State 
shall...pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law ...(see Addendum Exhibit 10). 
DOPL is a creation of the legislature of the State of Utah, and as such cannot violate ex 
post facto principles, as it did in this instant case. Neither the Petition against Jepson nor 
DOPL's actions gave Jepson "fair notice" of this new rule (changed Rule 502(4) or of the 
punishments which would flow from it's violation, which violation is ipso facto a 
violation of Title 58 and hence a crime. DOPL 's new rule and its Order makes that 
criminal which was not so at the time the action was performed in April, 2002. DOPL'S 
actions are punitive in nature, conclude that Jepson's conduct was "unlawful," thus, 
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criminal under Title 58, and are, in this case, ex post facto, and should be reversed and 
vacated. 
15. ISSUE: Whether DOPL's post trial substantive change to Utah Controlled 
Substance Act Rule Rl 56-37-502(4) and its retrospective application to appellant, 
making, without warning, his lawful legal possession of a controlled substance ipso 
facto unlawful, illegal, and unprofessional, and DOPL's application of the change to a 
"class of persons" (e.g. home health nurses) without compliance with the Utah 
Administrative Rule Making Act, is error and illegal, is beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by statute, is an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or fails to 
follow prescribed procedure, or is not supported by substantial evidence, or is 
contrary to the evidence? 
Ans: Yes. DOPL's actions are beyond statutory jurisdiction, are , error, illegal, 
unlawful procedure, fail to follow the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act, are not 
supported by substantial evidence, and are contrary to the evidence. 
16. ISSUE: Whether DOPL's actions constitute illegal, unconstitutional or ex post 
facto conduct? 
Ans: Yes. DOPL applied its aforesaid Rule change retrospectively over one year 
to Jepson's conduct, and made his then legal conduct illegal. It couldn't have done this 
without substantively changing Rule 502(4), because without that change, the Rule 
required Jepson to maintain control of the morphine, not relinquish control by "delivery" 
to Beckstroms. Thus DOPL's actions are illegal and ex post facto, which is then 
unconstitutional. Even if not held unconstitutional/ex post facto by this Court, DOPL's 
conduct is nevertheless illegal, since it contravenes statutory prohibitions against 
"delivery" and was totally unsupported by any competent evidence at trial (Exhibit 7). 
Fifth Analysis - Utah Administrative Rule Making Act & 
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Usurpation of Exclusive Legislative Authority 
DOPL did not follow its own Rule 502(4). Please note, the rule language contains 
no exceptions and exempts no group of persons. It applies to all persons equally who are 
licensed to handle narcotics in Utah - Doctors, Nurses, Dentists, Veterinarians, 
Pharmacists, etc. The aforesaid Rule change was made by way of two Conclusions of 
Law issued by DOPL: 
1. . . . Rl 5 6-37-502 (4). That rule governs a failure of a practitioner to maintain 
controls over controlled substances in an institutional setting as to effectively 
prevent the diversion, theft or shortage of such substances, (see Conclusions, p. 
11, lines 15-19) 
2. Rl56-37-502(4) does not strictly apply in a home health care setting. . . (see 
Conclusions, p. 11, lines 20-21) [emphasis added] 
By the first Conclusion, the ALJ/Board purportedly substantively changed Rule 
502(4) by restricting its application to an "institutional setting," which restrictive 
language appears nowhere in the Rule. By the second Conclusion they purportedly 
amend Rule 502(4) by suspending the Rule from applying to home health nurses, 
including Jepson, which suspending language appears nowhere in the actual Rule. These 
Conclusions are not announcing a nurse practice standard - they are changing a 
Controlled Substances Act Rule. DOPL has enacted no exceptions to Rule 
502(4)(which it is required to do by following rule making procedures and which it could 
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have done.13 under §63-46-3 et seq., UCA. Neither has it complied with the mandatory 
language of §63-46a-3, UCA, requiring it to enact rules within 120 days of a decision, 
e.g. as in this case. It has made a "substantive change" in Rule 502(4) (§63-46a-2(18)) 
without following "procedural requirements of chapter 46a (63-46a-14, UCA). Defendant 
challenges on basis of non-compliance. 
DOPL has created three new crimes: 
If Jepson obeyed Rule 502(4) and maintained control of a controlled 
substance, which he did, then (1) he is guilty of violating this new rule 
requiring him [retroactively] (a) to not obey Rule 502(4) and (b) to 
relinquish control of the controlled substance; (2) he is required 
[retroactively] to have made an illegal distribution of a controlled substance 
by "delivering" it to Beckstroms, persons for whom it was not prescribed, 
in violation of §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), UCA, Prohibited Acts, and (3) he is 
allegedly guilty of a theft or taking under §58-31b-502(7), UCA, for failing 
to "deliver" the controlled substance as required in (2) above. Remember 
also, the Board said Jepson acted "unlawfully" (Conclusions, 9:27; 13:9). 
Therefore, each of these new crimes is a misdemeanor, with a penalty affixed by 
statute. Only the legislature can define a crime, not DOPL. DOPL's conclusions in the 
instant case are not only unconscionable and incoherent, but are an illegal usurpation of 
exclusive legislative authority and must be vacated. (See State v. Gallion, 572 p. 2d 683 
(Utah 1977), confirmed by State v. Green, 793 p. 2d 912 (Utah App. 1990). 
13
 §63-46a-3(2)(c), (3), (4)(d), (6), (7)(a)(i),(b), (8)(b) - Utah Administrative Rule 
Making Act, - provides for the creation of an exception to a Rule and requires 
adherence to the Act when making any substantive change to a Rule, especially, and the 
Act is specific, if it applies to a "class of persons" ~ such as home health care nurses; 
§63-46a-4 UCA, Rule Making Procedure, "...when... amending... a rule agencies shall 
comply with (a) the requirements of this section55 [emphasis added]; 
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Even if this Court finds that DOPL's conduct was an interpretation rather than a 
substantive change to Rule 502(4), the interpretation must be consistent with statute, 
which it is not.14 
17. ISSUE: Whether DOPL must comply with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act in making substantive changes to Controlled Substances Act Rules, and whether 
failure to do so is a usurpation of exclusive legislative authority? 
Sixth Analysis - Judge Eklund 
Excluded Evidence & Gave False Assurance 
Rule 402 URE states: All relevant evidence is admissible... Rule 401 URE states: 
'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
Rule 103 URE provides that, Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which 
...excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected. . . or is plain error 
Jepson offered into evidence a written national standard for the security of 
Schedule II Controlled substances published by and listed on the web site of the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (hereafter "JCAHO"), 
attached hereto as Exhibit 16 and incorporated herein. It specifically stated it was based 
upon DEA regulations. The prosecution made a frivolous objection that the exhibit - a 
large chart - didn't include all three pages of the web site printout and they couldn't tell 
14
 In Fussel v. Department of Commerce, Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing, 815 P. 2d 250 (Utah App. 1991), this Court ruled that DOPL's 
interpretation of administrative rules must be consistent with governing statutes. 
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whether it was about home health care. I replied that the prosecution was free to 
introduce the other two pages into evidence if they wished and that on the face of the 
exhibit the words "Home Care," "Home Care," "Home Care Page," and "Home Care" 
appeared at least four times and were clearly visible and legible. Some of this discussion 
occurred in the hall out of the hearing of the Board. In the hearing Ms. Luke said the 
exhibit was "off the beam" was "irrelevant" and "We would have to go into a lot of 
studying..." and she thought it was "prejudicial. It's off the beam? Really? Is that a real 
competent objection? What it is, is incompetent nonsensical noise because she was 
unprepared and doesn't know the rules of evidence. The objections were baseless and 
frivolous. Based on that frivolous objection alone Judge Eklund went along and excluded 
the exhibit, admitting the exhibit says "Home Care Home Page" (MT 52:16-56:18, esp. 
54:22-23). He claimed he didn't find anything in the language that addresses a home 
health setting.. Well I had circled the language, quoted immediately below, in yellow on 
the exhibit. However, the language the Judge was reading was the next paragraph below 
that.(see). The language of the exhibit which Jepson offered into in evidence states: 
Q. Do all prescription and non-prescription drugs need to be secure? A: 
Yes. How secure depends on the classification of the medication as a 
"controlled substance" or not. Certainly all Schedule II controlled 
substances (narcotics) need to be secure under lock and key based on PEA 
laws and regulations (standard TX.3.4). Although most states no longer 
require a "double-lock" system, these products must be stored in a 
"substantially constructed locked cabinet". In addition, these drugs must be 
tightly controlled and accounted for, under law and regulation. 
This evidence went directly to ultimate issues in this home health care case. The 
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Judge castrated Jepson's substantial right and his attempt to defend himself on these 
issues and to present evidence which would probably have radically changed the outcome 
of the verdict. Jepson would have and should have been acquitted on all Counts. 
The wrongful exclusion of the above evidence allowed the Judge/Board to rule 
that: all Schedule II controlled substances (narcotics) need NOT be secure under lock 
and key based on PEA laws and regulations (standard TX.3.4) and that these drugs must 
NOT be tightly controlled and accounted for, under law and regulation — diametrically 
opposite from the above proffered evidence and "standard" for home health care, based 
upon federal law. 
Furthermore, this JCAHO standard was "evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. What facts and ultimate 
issues were affected? What defense was affected? Several. It would have: 
(1) directly impacted the determination of this action; (2) confirmed the 
correctness of Jepson's action in taking a lethal quantity of Morphine home 
and locking it up under a double lock; (3) tended to support the defense 
position that Jepson acted professionally and lawfully in following Rule 
502(4) and in electing not to "deliver55 the lethal Morphine to the 
Beckstroms; (4) confirmed that Rule 502(4) applies in home health care 
and must be followed by home health nurses; (5) tended to prevent the 
Judge/Board from restricting Rule 502(4) to institutions and suspending the 
application of Rule 502(4) to home health nursing, retroactively and ex post 
facto, and specifically to Jepson's April 2002 actions, (6) prevented a 
conclusion that Jepson acted unlawfully or criminally, (7) prevented a 
conclusion that Jepson acted unprofessionally; (8) prevented a conclusion 
that Jepson's election not to "deliver" the Morphine constituted, absent 
other evidence, theft or a "taking," and last but not least,(8) tended to have 
caused the Judge/Board to acquit Jepson on all Counts, which would have 
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kept Jepson's nursing record meticulously clean and spotless. 
Judge Eklund examined the exhibit and knew its content. By the exclusion of this 
evidence, Judge Eklund intentionally and knowingly adversely influenced the outcome of 
this case for Jepson, especially where, in light of the whole record, the exhibit agreed 
with all of the competent testimony from four competent experienced medical witnesses. 
In other words, Judge Eklund excluded exculpatory evidence which he knew would both 
help Jepson and destroy the prosecution's case. Judge Eklund's exclusionary ruling 
should be reversed. The Judge's exclusion of this evidence was harmful error15 and 
directly affected the outcome of the trial. The Judge did not rule that the evidence offered 
would be unfair, prejudicial, confusing or misleading, nor that it would cause delay, 
waste of time, or needless cumulative evidence under URE 403. He simply excluded it on 
a frivolous objection by the prosecutor. This prejudiced the Defense. (See State v 
Royball 710 p.2d 168,169, that the Trial Court so abused its discretion as to create a 
likelihood that injustice resulted; State v Jensen, 727 P 2d 201 (Utah 1986), confirmed) 
In closing argument prosecutor Cheryl Luke, in a shocking display of misconduct, 
asked the Board, "...was that a theft...?" (MT 190: 5), when the "whole record" proves 
no evidence of theft had been presented by prosecution, and theft had been disproved by 
the defense, and she knew it. Defense counsel asked for a conference outside the hearing 
of the Board/Jury (MT 195: 16-17). Strenuous objection was made off the record by 
15
 "To constitute an abuse of discretion, the ruling must have been harmful error." 
State v Dibello, 780 P,2d 1221 (Utah 1989) 
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Jepson as to the prosecutor's misconduct in alleging theft, when none of the elements of 
theft had been proven during trial. Objection was also made for the reason that the 
prosecutor was DOPL's attorney and the Board would believe what she said even without 
any proof - which the result proves - the Board bought it lock stock and barrel with no 
supporting prosecution evidence and contrary to clear defense evidence of no theft/taking. 
The Judge assured defense counsel that no finding of theft or taking would be made by 
the board. When reconvened, the Judge gave a defense requested jury instruction to the 
effect that a schedule II narcotic becomes the property of a patient at that point in time 
when it is "delivered" into the physical possession of the patient (MT 197:6-20; Exhibit 
9, Record p 233). The standard of care supporting that Instruction had been profusely 
adduced by the defense during trial and the Board was therefore not allowed to disregard 
it. Since no delivery had taken place, defense counsel was content to believe the Judge's 
off-record assurances, buttressed by his giving of the aforesaid jury instruction to correct 
the misconduct. No objection was therefore made in front of the jury since the 
misconduct problem seemed to have been corrected and defense counsel was, thereby 
lulled in to a feeling of security.16 Notwithstanding, the Judge's assurances, and the 
Instruction, DOPL through its Board, as drafted by the Judge, who gave the assurances 
and issued the Jury Instruction, found theft or taking (Exhibit 18 at 10:1-4; Record, p 
191:1-4), without mention of disregard of the Instruction and without identifying any 
16
 ..."the judge had lulled counsel into a feeling of security by promising to give the 
substance of a particular instruction." Johnson v Simons, 551 P.2d 515 (Utah 1976) 
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standard of care, other than by simply stating in two places, "The standard of care in 
nursing...requires...a competent witness..." (Conclusions 5:16-17, Record, p 186:16-17), 
and "Respondent violated the applicable standard of care because he failed to duly deliver 
that medication.." (Conclusions, 10:4-5; Record, p 191:4-5). Therefore, although there 
was a contemporaneous objection out side the hearing of the Jury, there was no objection 
on the record, under the circumstances, but: 
...the premise of rule 103(d) [URE] is that the ends of justice must not be 
lost sight of in the pursuit of procedural regularity and that when an error is 
plain, the trial court can legitimately be said to have had a reasonable 
opportunity to address and correct it, even in the absence of an objection. 
State v Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989) 
Jepson has here shown: 
that the prosecutor's remarks were obviously improper and harmful and that 
his failure to object did not lead the court into error. State v Emrnett, 839 
P.2d 781 (Utah 1992) 
Since the Instruction had been given based upon defense evidence during trial, and 
to correct misconduct, and there is no indication that the Board knowingly and 
intentionally disregarded it, it should be enforced, the prosecutor's misconduct identified 
for what it was - misconduct - and the aforesaid conclusion of theft/taking stricken, 
reversed, and vacated. 
18. ISSUE: Whether DOPL's trial judge wrongfully excluded relevant evidence 
affecting the right of appellant to present the national standard for the security of 
Schedule II narcotics in home health care of the Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of Healthcare organizations, "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence?" 
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Ans: Yes. 
19. ISSUE: Whether the trial Judge's false assurance to defense counsel that Board 
would not find a "taking" or "theft" caused failure to object? 
Ans: Yes. Can be reviewed under Manifest Injustice; Substantial Evidence Test, 
§63-46b-4 (g) 
MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES 
20. ISSUE: Whether the ordered reprimand should be vacated? 
Ans: Of course. It is not supported by substantial evidence. 
There is no basis for the three conclusions challenged herein above nor for Counts I and 
III. They should all be vacated and dismissed. No basis left for a reprimand. 
21. ISSUE: Whether the requirement of disclosure regarding a "Private 
reprimand" is reasonable or appropriate? 
Ans: It is probably a moot point given the answer to the last preceding issue. 
However, a private reprimand is not private if it requires "disclosure to even one other 
person or organization (e.g. Jepson's employer). Private means private, "not shared with 
others in any way, secret, hidden from others." 
CONCLUSION 
Jepson has marshaled the trial evidence and shown that the prosecution failed to 
meet its burden of proof, creating a trial record devoid of evidence, let alone substantial 
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evidence17, in support of Counts I and III of DOPL's Petition, or in support of the three 
challenged conclusions. The only medical evidence offered by the prosecution was 
Baker's testimony, who was incompetent to testify in this trial. Even if ruled a competent 
Expert by this Court, she only gave personal opinions, not expert, established no standard 
of care or practice about anything, disqualified herself about liquid morphine, the central 
issue, and failed to testify about any of the charging language or about any of the 
elements of the statutes and Rule cited in the petition, or about how Jepson violated any 
of them. She testified and advocated illegal criminal conduct of "distribution" and 
"delivery" of controlled substances. Baker was never accepted by the Court nor defense 
as Expert. She testified over six (6) defense objections. 
The defense thoroughly proved Jepson violated neither the charging language nor 
any of the cited statutes in Counts I and III. The findings and conclusions adverse to 
Jepson, challenged herein above, are contrary to the evidence adduced at trial and they, 
together with Counts I and III should be reversed, dismissed, and vacated, and Jepson's 
prior unblemished record restored, including an Order that no record nor reference to this 
disciplinary action be maintained in his file. If attorney's fees and costs are appropriate to 
be awarded to Jepson, please award them based on a Petition not brought or asserted in 
17
 Mountain Fuel Supply Co. VPublic Service Commission, 861 P.2d 414 222 
Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993) - "viewed in light of the whole record;" Utah Ass 'n of 
Counties v Tax Comm 'n of the State of Utah Nos. 930451, 930 (Utah 1995) "We have 
defined 'substantial evidence' as 'that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is 
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion" 
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good faith and in violation of Rule 11. Thank you. 
Dated this 6 day of December, 2004. 
^7^?^-
ron F. Jepso* 
Attorney for Scott Jepson 
Certificate of Delivery 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above Brief of 
Appellant has been hand delivered to Judge Mesuda Medcalt, Heber M. Wells Building, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, and to Karl Perry, Assistant Attorney 
General, Division of Commercial Enforcement, 160 East 300 South, Fifth floor, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84114, this 6th day of December, 2004. 
Arron F. Jepsojl/Atforney for Respondent / Appellant 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 1 
6 Statutes & 1 Rule 
A Crime Defined by the Legislature 
58-1-502. Unlawful conduct — Penalty. Unless otherwise specified in this 
title, any person who violates the unlawful conduct provisions defined in 
this title is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, [emphasis added] 
Title 58-37 - Controlled Substances Act - Crimes Defined by Legislature 
58-37-8(l)(a)(ii). Prohibited Acts — Penalties. (1) Except as authorized 
by this Chapter it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: (a)(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance . . . 
[emphasis added] 
58-37-2(l)(n). Definitions, (n) "Distribute" means to deliver other than 
by administering or dispensing a controlled substance or a listed chemical, 
[emphasis added] 
58-37-8(l)(a)(i),(ii),(iii). Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; 
or... [emphasis added] 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Prohibited Acts — Penalties It is unlawful for any 
person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, 
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional 
practice or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; [emphasis added] 
Rule Rl56-37 — Utah Controlled Substances Act Rule - Passed by the Legislature 
Utah Controlled Substances Act Rule - Rl56-37-502(4) [Rule 502(4)]. 
"Unprofessional conduct" means (4) failing to maintain controls over 
controlled substances which would be considered by a prudent practitioner 
to be effective against diversion, theft, or shortage of controlled substances; 
[emphasis added] 
Criminal Code - Passed by the Legislature 
76-6-404. Theft -- Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session [emphasis added] 
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ADDUNDUM EXHIBIT IB 
Charging Language & Statutes under Counts I & III 
Count I - Jepson possessed controlled substances outside of his responsibilities as a 
nurse; 
This allegation was based upon three (3) conduct statutes and two (2) 
penalty statutes, referred to in the petition (see Petition, page 5, Count I) the text of 
which provide [with emphasis added]: 
a. 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) UCA - Prohibited Acts - Penalties (2) It is unlawful: for 
any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance, UNLESS it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, 
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional 
practice or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(58-37-2(ee)UCA - "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, pharmacist • . . ) 
b. 58-31b-502 (5), UCA - Unprofessional conduct includes (5) unlawfully 
obtaining, possessing, or using a prescription drug or illicit drug; 
c. 58-l-501(2)(a) UCA - Unlawful & Unprofessional Conduct - (2) 
Unprofessional conduct means conduct by a licensee that is defined as 
unprofessional conduct under this title (58) or under any rule adopted 
under this title and includes: 
(a) violating, or aiding, or abetting any other person to violate any 
statute, rule, or order regulating an occupation or profession under 
this title; 
Two penalty provisions were also included: 
d. 58-l-401(2)(a)(b) UCA: The division may refuse to issue a license to an 
applicant and may refuse to renew or may revoke, suspend, restrict, place 
on probation, issue a public or private reprimand to, or otherwise act upon 
the license of any licensee in any of the following cases: 
(a) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unprofessional 
conduct, as defined by statute or rule under this title; 
(b) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unlawful conduct 
as defined by statute under this title; 
e. 58-31b-402(l) UCA: After a proceeding pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 
46b, Administrative Procedures Act, and Title 58, Chapter 1, Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, the division may impose an 
administrative penalty of up to $10,000 for unprofessional or unlawful 
conduct under this chapter in accordance with a fine schedule established 
by rule. 
Count III - Jepson failed to produce a medication . . . for a patient, [emphasis added] 
This allegation was based solely upon one (1) conduct statute 58-3 lb-
502(7) and two (2) penalty statutes, set forth under Count I above, (see Petition, 
page 6, Count III). 
a. §58-31b-502(7), UCA provides: Unprofessional conduct includes . . . (7) 
unauthorized taking or personal use of a patient's personal property. 
b. 58-l-401(2)(a) UCA: The division may refuse to issue a license to an 
applicant and may refuse to renew or may revoke, suspend, restrict, place on 
probation, issue a public or private reprimand to, or otherwise act upon the license 
of any licensee in any of the following cases: 
(a) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unprofessional 
conduct, as defined by statute or rule under this title; 
c. 58-31b-402(l) UCA: After a proceeding pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 
46b, Administrative Procedures Act, and Title 58, Chapter 1, Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, the division may impose an 
administrative penalty of up to $10,000 for unprofessional or unlawful 
conduct under this chapter in accordance with a fine schedule established 
by rule. 
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Page 2 of 2 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT IC 
Charging Language and Statutes/Rule of Counts II & IV 
Count II - Was dismissed after trial for lack of evidence. (See Conclusions: p. 11, % 1, 
lines 11-13; see also p. 10, If 3, lines 13-27, and p. 11 lines 1-4). This Count II alleged: 
Jepson (1) failed to administer medication to his patient as prescribed; and (2) maintained 
a patient's narcotics medication at his residence and (3) disposed of the same without a 
proper witness; and (4) failed to report his suspicion that the patient was a victim of 
abuse; [emphasis and numbers added] 
This allegation was based upon two (2) conduct statutes and two (2) penalty 
statutes, referred to in the petition (see Petition, page 6, Count I) the text of which 
provide [with emphasis added]: 
a. § 76-5-111.l(l)(2)(a)(i) UCA: Any person, including but not limited 
to, a social worker, physician, phschologist, nurse, teacher, or employee of a 
private or public facility serving adults, who has reason to believe that any 
disabled or elder adult has been the subject of abuse, emotional or phychological 
abuse, neglect, or exploitation shall immediately notify the nearest peace officer, 
law enforcement agency, or local office of Adult Protective Services within the 
Department of Human Services, Division of Aging and Adult Services. 
b. §58-1-501 (2)(g) UCA: Unprofessional conduct means conduct by a 
licensee that is defined as unprofessional conduct under this title or under any rule 
adopted under this title and includes: (g) practicing or attempting to practice on 
occupation or profession regulated under this title through gross incompetence, 
gross negligence, or a pattern of incompetency or negligence: 
c. 58-l-401(2)(a) UCA: The division may refuse to issue a license to an 
applicant and may refuse to renew or may revoke, suspend, restrict, place on 
probation, issue a public or private reprimand to, or otherwise act upon the license 
of any licensee in any of the following cases: 
(a) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unprofessional 
conduct, as defined by statute or rule under this title; 
d. 58-31b-402(l) UCA: After a proceeding pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 
46b, Administrative Procedures Act, and Title 58, Chapter 1, Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, the division may impose an 
administrative penalty of up to $10,000 for unprofessional or unlawful 
conduct under this chapter in accordance with a fine schedule established 
by rule. 
Count IV - Was also dismissed after trial for lack of evidence. (See Conclusions: p. 11, If 
3, lines 24-26). It alleged that Jepson maintained a controlled substance at his home and 
destroyed the same without a witness, and engaged in unprofessional conduct defined in 
Rule R156-37-502(4), Utah Controlled Substances Act Rules, (hereafter "Rule" or "Rule 
156") [emphasis added] 
This Count is based upon one Rule: Utah Controlled Substances Act Rule 
R156-37-502(4) (herein after "Rule" or "Rule 156") and upon essentially the same 
two penalty statutes cited under Count I above. Rule 156 states: 
a. Rule - Rl56-37-502(4), UCA: "unprofessional conduct" means: 
...(4) failing to maintain controls over controlled substances which would 
be considered by a prudent practitioner to be effective against diversion, 
theft, or shortage of controlled substances; (see Petition, Count IV, p. 6), on 
file, [emphasis added] 
b. 58-l-401(2)(a) UCA: The division may refuse to issue a license to an 
applicant and may refuse to renew or may revoke, suspend, restrict, place on 
probation, issue a public or private reprimand to, or otherwise act upon the license 
of any licensee in any of the following cases: 
(a) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unprofessional 
conduct, as defined by statute or rule under this title; 
c. 58-31b-402(l) UCA: After a proceeding pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 
46b, Administrative Procedures Act, and Title 58, Chapter 1, Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, the division may impose an 
administrative penalty of up to $10,000 for unprofessional or unlawful conduct 
under this chapter in accordance with a fine schedule established by rule. 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT ID 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act 
63-46a-3. When rulemaking is required. 
(1) Each agency shall: 
(a) maintain a current version of its rules; and 
(b) make it available to the public for inspection during its regular business hours. 
(2) In addition to other rulemaking required by law, each agency shall make rules 
when agency action: 
(a) authorizes, requires, or prohibits an action; 
(b) provides or prohibits a material benefit; 
(c) applies to a class of persons or another agency; and 
(d) is explicitly or implicitly authorized by statute. 
(3) Rulemaking is also required when an agency issues a written interpretation of a 
state or federal legal mandate. 
(4) Rulemaking is not required when: 
(a) agency action applies only to internal agency management, inmates or residents of a 
state correctional, diagnostic, or detention facility, persons under state legal custody, 
patients admitted to a state hospital, members of the state retirement system, or students 
enrolled in a state education institution; 
(b) a standardized agency manual applies only to internal fiscal or administrative details 
of governmental entities supervised under statute; 
(c) an agency issues policy or other statements that are advisory, informative, or 
descriptive, and do not conform to the requirements of Subsections (2) and (3); or 
(d) an agency makes nonsubstantive changes in a rule, except that the agency shall 
file all nonsubstantive changes in a rule with the division. 
(5) A rule shall enumerate any penalty authorized by statute that may result from its 
violation. 
(6) Each agency shall enact rules incorporating the principles of law not already in its 
rules that are established by final adjudicative decisions within 120 days after the 
decision is announced in its cases. 
(7) (a) Each agency may enact a rule that incorporates by reference: 
(i) all or any part of another code, rule, or regulation that has been adopted by a 
federal agency, an agency or political subdivision of this state, an agency of another 
state, or by a nationally recognized organization or association; 
(ii) state agency implementation plans mandated by the federal government for 
participation in the federal program; 
(iii) lists, tables, illustrations, or similar materials that are subject to frequent change, 
fully described in the rule, and are available for public inspection; or 
(iv) lists, tables, illustrations, or similar materials that the director determines are too 
expensive to reproduce in the administrative code. 
(b) Rules incorporating materials by reference shall: 
(i) be enacted according to the procedures outlined in this chapter; 
(ii) state that the referenced material is incorporated by reference; 
(iii) state the date, issue, or version of the material being incorporated; and 
(iv) define specifically what material is incorporated by reference and identify any agency 
deviations from it. 
(c) The agency shall identify any substantive changes in the material incorporated by 
reference by following the rulemaking procedures of this chapter. 
(d) The agency shall maintain a complete and current copy of the referenced material 
available for public review at the agency and at the division. 
(8) (a) This chapter is not intended to inhibit the exercise of agency discretion within the 
limits prescribed by statute or agency rule. 
(b) An agency may enact a rule creating a justified exception to a rule. 
(9) An agency may obtain assistance from the attorney general to ensure that its rules 
meet legal and constitutional requirements. 
Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session 
63-46a-4. Rulemaking procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Sections 63-46a-6 and 63-46a~7, when making, amending, or 
repealing a rule agencies shall comply with: 
(a) the requirements of this section; 
(b) consistent procedures required by other statutes; 
(c) applicable federal mandates; and 
(d) rules made by the division to implement this chapter 
(2) Subject to the requirements of this chapter, each agency shall develop and use flexible 
approaches in drafting rules that meet the needs of the agency and that involve persons 
affected by the agency's rules. 
(3) (a) Each agency shall file its proposed rule and rule analysis with the division. 
(b) Rule amendments shall be marked with new language underlined and deleted 
language struck out. 
(c) (i) The division shall publish the information required under Subsection (3) on the 
rule analysis and the text of the proposed rule in the next issue of the bulletin. 
(ii) For rule amendments, only the section or subsection of the rule being amended need 
be printed. 
(iii) If the director determines that the rule is too long to publish, the director shall 
publish the rule analysis and shall publish the rule by reference to a copy on file with the 
division. 
(4) Prior to filing a rule with the division, the department head shall consider and 
comment on the fiscal impact a rule may have on businesses. 
(5) The rule analysis shall contain: 
(a) a summary of the rule or change; 
(b) the purpose of the rule or reason for the change; 
(c) the statutory authority or federal requirement for the rule; 
(d) the anticipated cost or savings to: 
(i) the state budget; 
(ii) local governments; and 
(iii) other persons; 
(e) the compliance cost for affected persons; 
(f) how interested persons may review the full text of the rule; 
(g) how interested persons may present their views on the rule; 
(h) the time and place of any scheduled public hearing; 
(i) the name and telephone number of an agency employee who may be contacted about 
the rule; 
(j) the name of the agency head or designee who authorized the rule; 
(k) the date on which the rule may become effective following the public comment 
period; and 
(1) comments by the department head on the fiscal impact the rule may have on 
businesses. 
(6) (a) For a rule being repealed and reenacted, the rule analysis shall contain a summary 
that generally includes the following: 
(i) a summary of substantive provisions in the repealed rule which are eliminated from 
the enacted rule; and 
(ii) a summary of new substantive provisions appearing only in the enacted rule. 
(b) The summary required under this Subsection (6) is to aid in review and may not be 
used to contest any rule on the ground of noncompliance with the procedural 
requirements of this chapter. 
(7) A copy of the rule analysis shall be mailed to all persons who have made timely 
request of the agency for advance notice of its rulemaking proceedings and to any other 
person who, by statutory or federal mandate or in the judgment of the agency, should also 
receive notice. 
(8) Following the publication date, the agency shall allow at least 30 days for public 
comment on the rule. 
(9) (a) Except as provided in Sections 63-46a-6 and 63-46a-7, a proposed rule becomes 
effective on any date specified by the agency that is no fewer than 30 nor more than 120 
days after the publication date. 
(b) The agency shall provide notice of the rule's effective date to the division in the form 
required by the division. 
(c) The notice of effective date may not provide for an effective date prior to the date it is 
received by the division. 
(d) The division shall publish notice of the effective date of the rule in the next issue of 
the bulletin. 
(e) A proposed rule lapses if a notice of effective date or a change to a proposed rule is 
not filed with the division within 120 days of publication. Amended by Chapter 138, 
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Tab 2 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 2 
6 Objections to Nurse Baker's Testimony 
(April 25, 2004 - Transcript (AT) pp. 98-100, 136) 
Lima: Once a controlled substance prescription is issued to a patient, does the 
home health nurse determine if and when the medication can either be physically 
delivered to the patient or the caregivers or be retained by the patient or the 
caregivers? P 98, lines 19-23 
1st Objection - "I am going to object. I think that's a Legal question. 
Depends upon what the statute says and the rules say. It's not subject to an 
opinion on that point" P 98 line 24 thin P 99 line 2 
Judge replied: "I think the question was put to the witness in the capacity as an 
Expert Witness and I think she can answer to the extent she understands the 
question." P 99, lines 3-6 
2nd Objection - "Then I object because she has not been qualified in that 
area" P 99, lines 7-8 
Judge replied "I think she was being offered as one, is she not, Miss 
Lima?" P 99, lines 9-10 
Lima says: "She is" P 99, line 11 
3rd Objection - "I beg your pardon, Judge. She was offered"[?] - "she was 
not offered, but I guess she is now" [being offered] "as a qualified expert 
on home health nursfing]." [editing added to clarify Atty Jepson's shock 
and surprise and reply to Judge's action of offering the witness himself as 
an expert since the prosecution had not done so] 
Judge replied, "I think that's what she is here to testify - p 99, lines 15-16 
Further Objection - "Yeah. The question here is where the legal duty lies 
as to who makes what determination and I think we can - " P 99, lines 17-19 
Judge replies: "The question was put in the context of a home health nurse and the 
question, as I recall it, was does the home health care nurse have the authority to 
decide when or how to administer controlled substances." . . . . P 99, lines 20-24 
4th Objection - "Exactly. And the word authority means nurses are 
controlled by statute and regulations and so the proper question should be, 
if it's asked, what is the statute or where is the regulation and what does it 
say, not do you have an opinion about what the law is, so I maintain my 
objection P 99, line 25 thru P 100, line5 
Judge replied: I think the witness can answer the question and the source and the 
basis for her answer can then be explored and then I'll allow it. . P 100, lines 6-8 
Witness: If I understand the question correctly, are you asking me if a pharmacist 
prescribes - or if a physician prescribes a medication for a patient is there any 
reason why I don't think that patient should have that medication?P 100, lines 9-13 
Ms. Lima: Yes P 100, line 14 
5th Objection - "Objection. That is not what the question was. The 
question was a determination of authority to act, not what her opinion 
is." P 100, lines 15-17 
6th Objection: Mr. Scott Jepson: Objection. She has already clearly stated 
that she doesn't have the background in administering narcotics to have any 
expert testimony P. 136, lines 3-5 
(Note: No ruling by the Judge on this last objection. No ruling ever made whether 
Baker is accepted by the court as an expert witness or whether her testimony is being 
allowed.) 
Tab 3 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 3 
Nurse Baker Disqualifies Herself 
(April Transcript p. 118, line 25 through p. 119, line 17) 
Q: Okay. So you have had some experience administering morphine? 
A: At the time I was an L.P.N., so very little. 
Q: Rarely? 
A: And usually it was I.M. 
Q: Did you ever administer IV. morphine? 
A: No. 
Q: Okay. And then since then, you have not had positions or — you haven't had 
any kind of position where you would have exposure to being required to 
administer I.V. morphine, correct? 
A: Nope. 
Q: So your testimony is that you have no experience in administration or control of 
I.V. morphine? 
A: No. 
Q: Thank you. 
Mr. Arron Jepson: No, means no experience? 
The Witness: Right 
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Tab 4 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 4 
Examples of Nurse Baker's Personal-Opinion-Non-Expert Testimony 
April 25, 2003 Transcript (AT) 
"If I were going (P. 98, lines 1-2 
"I would recommend..." (98, line 2) 
"I think it's important..." (p 98, line 4 
What is the standard of care...?" (P 100 line 20). "I felt like...if I was concerned... I 
would..." (p 101, lines 3, 7-8). 
"If I felt like it was a safe situation..." P 101, line 3 
""My job would be ..." P 101, line 6 
"If I was concerned and felt like..." P 101, line 7 
"I would involve ..." P 101, line 8 
"...who I was working ..." P 101, line 9 
"I think it would be up to the nurse and the family." P 101, line 14 
"You would like to have somebody watch you ..." P 101, line 18 
"I think as a nurse I would want to record that just to cover 
myself..." P 102, lines 20-21 
"Probably in the patient's record and perhaps in a log..." P 103, lines 1-2 
"I would report..." (P 117, line 5); 
"My understanding is... I don't believe so." (P 123. Lines 5, 21); 
"I understand as a nurse..." (P 124, line 3); 
"If it wasn't a safe situation I wouldn't be in there taking care of the 
patient." P 127, line 13 thru P 128, line 7 
"I would write down...because I care for my license...! would probably...When I 
recorded...! would do it right there..." (P 137, lines 5,9,14,20,22) 
"I wouldn't want...No I would want...! don't believe so." . . . . (P 138, lines 5,7,11) 
Note: DOPL, through its Attorney Karl Parry, has admitted that Nurse 
Baker gave only personal opinion answers: "as to how she would act or 
handle different situations as posed to her..." (See DOPL Memo to 
Department of Commerce on Review, p. 17, lines 11-14; Record, p. 
89:11-14) 
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Tab 5 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 5 
Nurse Baker's Only Testimony Regarding "Standard of Care" 
1) April 25, 2003 Transcript - P 100, line 20 through p. 101 line 15 
Q: What is the standard of care when — in a situation where a patient is issued 
controlled substances by his or her physician? Is the nurse — does the nurse have 
any say as to whether or not the family can retain the drug? 
A: Well, the nurse — the person probably wouldn't be accepted for home health 
unless it was a safe situation and a workable situation, because you have to have a 
caregiver there, especially for a patient like this, If I felt like it was a safe situation 
and they were giving her her medications correctly and she has a new one ordered 
that was a controlled substance, it would be — you know, my job would be to 
make sure they understood how to use it safely and — if I was concerned and felt 
like that wasn't going to work, then, again I would involve a social worker or 
someone else in my — who I was working with and maybe get some interventions 
going and find a more workable situation. 
2) April 25, 2003 Transcript - P 101, line 16 through p. 102 line 1 
Q: What is the standard of care regarding the wasting of controlled substances in a 
home health setting? 
A: You would like to have somebody watch you waste it, if that's what you were 
going to do. I am thinking — say you had a medication order and you didn't need 
it at the time. You would, you know, keep it in the refrigerator or just store it. It's 
— you know, it's got the patient's name on it, not the nurse. My duty would be to 
make sure they understood about the medication and you know, ongoing teaching 
and then evaluation of the patient and her medications and what was and what was 
working and what wasn't. 
3) April 25, 2003 Transcript - P 102, line 2 through p. 102 line 17 
Q: If the decision was made to waste the medication, could you walk me through 
the process of how that waste would actually occur, according to your 
interpretation or understanding of the standard of care as it applies to a nurse in a 
home health setting? 
A: If it was a controlled substance I would have the family watch me and we 
would waste it together. I did a lot of hospice nursing and when we have to change 
a morphine cassette you would bring out the new morphine cassette to put in and 
the old one to take out. And maybe there was a few cc's of morphine left. The 
family would watch you cut the bag and waste it and put in the new one. Again, 
you know, narcotics in a home health situation, you are involved in that when it's 
a safe situation. You don't take people off the service it's not safe so it's never 
been an issue. 
4) April 25, 2003 Transcript - P 102, line 2 through p. 102 line 17 
Q: If you worked for a facility that had no separate wasting forms or procedure in 
place, what would be the nursing practice that you think meets minimum standard 
of care in handling a wasting situation? 
A: Well I would have a competent witness. 
Mr. Arron Jepson: Excuse me. I'm sorry. I have to object. The question phrased 
says Minimum standard of care. There is only one standard of care. Is there a 
minimum and maximum? And if there is then the question assumes facts not in 
evidence. 
Administrative Law Judge: Tell the witness to not relate her answer on the basis of 
any minimum; just as to the standard of care. 
Q: (My Ms. Luke) Just as to the standard of care. 
A: I would write down the medication that I was wasting and the amount. I would 
have the person who was witnessing me make sure that they understood the 
magnitude of what we were doing. I would write it down and record it, because I 
care for my license. 
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Tab 6 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 6 
Lay Witnesses - Foundation Elements 
Evidentiary Foundations, 3 ed., Imwinkelried, Edward J., The Michie Co. Law 
Publishers, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1995, pp. 241-246; 
Collective Fact or Shorthand Rendition Witness 1) The Witness was in a position to 
observe; 2) the witness in fact observed; 3) the witness observed enough data to form a 
reliable opinion; and 4) the witness states the opinion. "... the opinion is the type of 
inference that lay persons commonly and reliably draw; and — the key to the doctrine — 
the lay witness cannot verbalize all the underlying sensory data supporting the opinion." 
Ibid, p 242 "The Judge will assume that the witness has enough common, human 
experience to be able to estimate distance, time, or height." Ibid p 243; 
Skilled Lay Observer Witness 1) The witness is familiar with the person or his or her 
voice or handwriting style; 2) The witness explains how he or she became familiar; and 
3) The witness states his or her opinion. "In each of these situations, if the witness has 
had repeated, prior opportunities for observation, the witness qualifies as a skilled lay 
observer." Ibid p 243 
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Tab 7 
Summary of Prosecution's Case-in-Chief 
April 25, 2003 Transcript (AT) — Events of April, 2002 
KAREN BECKSTROM - Mortensen's Daughter, <- begins at p. 16 
Described Mother's condition and living arrangements pp 16-22 
Apr 11 Described Jepson's April 11 visit to home and his call to Dr. Hogensen pp 23-26 
Described medications Mortensen was on p 23-p 25 
Described Dr Hogensen prescribed Patches and 30mg liquid morphine p 26 
Described Jepson and husband, Garth, went together to get prescriptions and to 
Shopco pharmacy and returned home with only patches p 26 
Described her concern that Dr. Hogensen didn't work on Fri or Mon and "it would 
be a length of time without any increase in the medication for pain" p 27 
Described where she lives p 27 
Described husband's and Jepson's conversation on way back from pharmacy and 
and Jepson's unsuccessful attempts to find unit dose vials of morphine p 27 - p 28 
Described Jepson left to get new prescription for morphine p 28 
Claimed she did not hear back from Jepson that evening (Apr 11; contradicted 
by Jepson's testimony; Husband couldn't remember) p 28 - p 29 
Claimed Jepson did not explain patches to her (contradicted by Husband) . . P 29 
Jepson talked about Morphine with them p 29 
Claimed she was not going to administer the morphine herself p 29 
No one ever administered the Duragesic Patches p 29 
She administered 4 Lortab to Mortensen on April 11 p 29 —p 30 
Jepson did not administer Duragesic Patches on April 11 p30 
Jepson did not come into house on way back from Pharmacy p30 
She got no direct instruction on where to place patches (Jepson & Husband 
contradict) P 30 
Apr 12 Described Mother (Mortensen) as "much better" next day - on 12th P 31 
Said Garth called Scott and left message "if prescription for Morphine was 
not filled, please do not do so p 31 
"The more she got thinking about it she thought she didn't know for sure 
jf her mother really did need the morphine" P31 
"We didn't feel we really wanted it" P31 
"My mother probably did not need it" P31 
Jepson came, said he did not have morphine, p31 
Then she said she didn't know if she actually asked about the morphine . . . p 32 
She said there were different days they discussed the morphine after 
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the 12th p 32 
Jepson did not take vitals because Mother was sitting at table p33 
The 12th was a Friday p 32 
Jepson said he though Mortensen's recovery was remarkable p 32 
Claims Garth asked Jepson on 12th about cost of Morphine and paid him (this 
was contradicted by Garth) P 33 
Apr 13 Claims they asked Jepson about morphine - he said it would be an illegal 
distribution of drugs to give it to them and he had destroyed it p 34 - 35 
Karen said she wondered why ... "But then I thought well, I was the one too that 
said I didn't want the morphine" P 35 
Said she reported concern 1 week later p 35 
Apr 24 Another substitute nurse came, she had reported to nursing director at First 
Choice p 37 
Apr 25, 2003 - One year later — 
Said they were still caring for Mother, Mortensen. (Note: no subsequent need 
for liquid Morphine arose in over 1 year!) P 37 
X-Examination: 
Nothing negative to report about Jepson p 39 
Next substitute nurse was Andrea Swenson an LPN p 40 
Dr. Hogensen wanted to make sure Mortensen had adequate pain medication 
because he wouldn't be back in office for several days p 40 
Reviewed conversation about morphine - she claimed again that Jepson 
claimed it would be illegal distribution of drugs to give her the morphine .p 43 - 44 
Neither LPN Swenson nor Director of Nursing Mark Francis told Karen 
about the Standard of Practice set out in Rule R-l 56-37-502(4) P 48 — 49 
Said she was aware of several calls to different pharmacies by Jepson because 
her husband told her P 49 
Said she did not know what original prescription was - never saw it p 49 
Said she knew original prescription got changed p 49 
Said she knew change was because quantity was not available p 49 - 50 
Re-direct Examination 
Said Jepson left her in control of Lortabs already in her possession p 50 
Re-Cross Examination: 
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Said she took responsibility of administering the Lortabs p 50 
Said she felt nurse would have responsibility for administering liquid 
Morphine p51 
Said she had responsibility for other medications p51 
Board Questions: 
Said Duragesic Patches were never used p 51-52 
Asked if Morphine was ever used (no answer recorded) p 52 
SHANE TIERNAN - INVESTIGATOR 
Testimony begins p 53 
Gave general background information about himself, work history, etc. . P 53-55 
Interviewed Jepson April 30, 2002 p 55 
Described receiving complaint from Mark Francis at First Choice p 55 
Said Jepson never took the morphine to Mortensen's family house p 56 
Described prescription filling problems p 55 - 56 
Said one of the reasons Jepson did not bring Morphine was he was suspicious that 
family was trying to get him to play a part in a murder or assisted suicide plot 
(Jepson contests this as a misrepresentation of their conversation) . . . . P 57 - 58 
Said Jepson got prescription filled late and he called Beckstroms evening of April 
11 and told them he was not coming by and took it home and put it in his 
refrigerator P 58 
Apr 12 Said Jepson returned to Beckstroms house on April 12 p 58 
Said Jepson said Mortensen was up eating breakfast; Karen Beckstroms made 
comments to him about it being God's will, etc. and some discussion about the 
morphine p 59 
Said Jepson said he told Beckstroms he had a moral and legal obligation to keep 
the morphine p 59 
Tiernan said he "believed" Jepson was paid for the morphine on the 12th (this was 
disputed by both Jepson and Garth Beckstrom) P 59 
Tiernan read from his report notes: Jepson informed family on Sunday or Monday 
(April 14 or 15) he disposed of morphine because Mortensen no longer needed it. 
Karen Beckstrom told Jepson that he could pay for the morphine next time 
Mortensen needed it. Jepson was upset over the payment situation p 60 
Tiernan gave his own interpretation - that Beckstroms were upset because they had 
to pay for something they couldn't see p 61 
Judge said: Don't think "we" are asking - included himself as a prosecutor . p 61 
Said Jepson kept the morphine because he felt the family was trying to kill 
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Mortensen - and he did not want the liability - felt it was his ethical obligation to 
keep morphine p 62 - 63 
Claimed Jepson made decision to dump morphine down sink and did not have 
anybody witness that p 63 - 64 
X-Examination by Arron Jepson: 
Tiernan was asked if most companies provide a narcotics waste sheet? . . P 64-65 
He answered "They can" P 65 
He was asked if that was normal practice and he replied it depends on the kind of 
setting p 65 
He was asked if he was aware of the standards that require a witness 
documentation to a wasting - he said "I am" P 65 
Said that where Jepson picked up the prescription for someone else "that changes 
the standard" P 65 
Question: "So you are saying in this particular situation with Mr. Jepson there is 
no requirement for a narcotic waste sheet and a signature by a witness?" He 
answered, "In somebody's private home, no." P 65 
Discussion about what Jepson meant by "no witness" and whether he could have 
meant he had "no witness signature" on a waste sheet - i.e. no witness. Tiernan 
finally agreed Jepson could have meant that.- "sure" P 65 - 68, line 13 
X-Examination by Scott Jepson: 
Scott and Tiernan discussed and argued about some of the things from their April 
30, 2002 interview that Scott claimed were missing from Tiernan's report -
Tiernan claimed that a nurse could only be in possession of a narcotic long enough 
to pick it up and transport it to the patient p 68 - 69 
Tiernan was questioned about Scott's assertion that a nurse who has responsibility 
for administering a narcotic also has responsibility to keep the narcotic safe from 
theft and diversion Tiernan answered that as he understood Scott's position it was 
that Scott had to maintain possession p 69-71 
Then Tiernan changed his testimony to be, "the problem I had was the time that 
you maintained possession." P 72 
Scott questioned Tiernan about waste sheet requirement and Tiernan answered and 
said he did not know where in the law there was anything about waste shee|s 73-74 
Jepson asked, "You previously said that it wasn't required to have a witness waste 
in a home health setting." Tiernan answered, "Because it's somebody's 
prescription." P 74 
Discussion about payment of $26.00 for the morphine and where it was in 
Tiernan's report P 74-75 
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Re-Direct Examination - Ms. Lima 
Asked about what Jepson said in initial interview about wasting morphine . . p 75 
Tiernan said Jepson said he didn't want family to have it, he didn't think they 
should have it. Said he didn't have anybody witness the waste and that it was 
his legal, moral and ethical obligation and responsibility to get rid of it . . . . P 75 
Discussion with Judge re testimony of lay witness about a legal conclusion p 76-77 
Asked about a Family's responsibility about possession of a controlled substance 
and the wasting of a drug Ans: no obligation to maintain a record P 77 
Asked if that same obligation or lack of obligation apply to a licensed health care 
professional? Ans: "I don't know that it's required in the law P 77 
Tiernan gave his personal opinion that there is a responsibility to account - to have 
someone elwse say yes I say morphine go down the sink and to write it down p 78 
Re-X-Examination - Arron Jepson: 
Questioned about his contradictory testimony. He answered that the nurse would 
"want that to be witnessed because - for him to maintain that possession." p 78 - 79 
Testified he had no knowledge of the " what the Procedures and policies and forms 
availability are from First Choice" P 79 
Re-X-Examination - Scott Jepson 
Discussed initial interview again on point of who could witness a wasting and that 
Tiernan said he recalled telling Jepson that "security guards" can witness a 
narcotics wasting and it doesn't have to be another licensed professional . . . p 80 
Board Examination 
Ms. Price - asked about the initial interview and reason Jepson said he wasted the 
morphine - Tiernan said Jepson reported in the initial interview that he felt they 
were giving her too much pain medication but that he didn't know if Jepson felt 
that way at the time that he got - obtained the prescription P81 
Questioned about location in Tiernan's report - Scott and Arron Jepson p 82-83 
Board Examination continued 
Ms. Bittner asked who Mark Francis was - Tiernan answered "Supervisor" P 84 
Also asked who Jeff Fisher was - Ans: Pharmacist p 84 
Continued Re-X-Examination - Arron Jepson 
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Arron Jepson asked Tiernan to read from his report - the reading disclosed that 
Jepson had actually said he thought perhaps the daughter had given Mortensen too 
much pain medication - the report did not say anything about a murder/suicide 
comment by Jepson which is contrary to Tiernan's prior testimony . . . . P 84-85 
Scott Jepson refreshed Tiernan's memory about a hypothetical he had posed to 
Tiernan during the initial interview on Apr 30, 2002 about the handling of 
300mg/20ml solution of liquid morphine land the possibility that the family might 
have succumbed to administering the liquid morphine at 2:00 o'clock a.m. because 
of severe paid and accidently killed Mortensen. Would he then be charged with 
negligent homicide and that Tiernan had told him, "that's the way it goes when 
you have a license." Tiernan denied any memory of his reply to Jepson . p 84-87 
Arron Jepson restated the hypothetical. Prosecution objected. Judge ruled witness 
could only answer if he understood the question. Witness said he did understand 
the question. Witness Tiernan gave three answers: 1) "I couldn't tell you; 2) I 
don't think that the nurse - it was the doctor that prescribed the morphine... and 3) 
"I don't know that the nurse would bear the responsibility." P 87 - 89 
ELIZABETH BAKER - RN 
Testimony begins p 90 
Background included LPN 1971, RN 1994, Salt Lake Community College; 12 
year in home health '85-'93 and c94-'98; medicine and oncology Hospital; 
Telephone triage; Bureau of Licensing State of Ltah p 90-92 
Background - services provided as home health nurse? - set-up plan, assess; 
referrals; set up home health aid; short term; always thinking discharge planning; a 
lot of teaching to care giver and patient P 92-93 
Reviewed 14 documents for trial p 93 
Does not know Scott Jepson p 93 
Prepared a report to DOPL dated Feb 3, 2003 p 94 
Concerns about a patient? "What should you do?" P 94-95 
Sustained objection to a repeat of question p 96 
"Is it important to document a concern?" Ans: "Oh, absolutely." Then described 
old system of boxes etc P 95 
Asked about nurses duty to educate patient or caregiver p 96 
Sustained Objection to compound question P 97 
"Does a home health nurse have a duty to educate the patient and/or her 
caregivers, and, if so , how?" Answers included: 
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"if I were going to be doing some teaching p 98 lines 1-2 
I would recommend ..." P 98 line 2 
"I think it's important..." P 98, line 4 
Asked who is responsible for security and administration of a controlled 
substances? Baker answered : 
"I would say whoever the controlled substance is issued to. It's their 
medication." P 98, lines 10-13 
Who is responsible for security of medication maintained in a home - Ans: 
Family p. 98, lines 14-18 
Up to this point Nurse Baker had not been offered by the prosecution as an expert 
witness, nor had the required foundation be laid for expert testimony concerning the 
control, handling, and administration of liquid morphine - the central issue in this 
case, nor had the Court ruled or accepted Baker as an expert witness? 
Asked whether a home health nurse determines if and when a medication can 
either be physically "delivered" to the patient or caregivers or maintained by 
them? P 98, lines 19-23 
1st Objection - "I am going to object. I think that's a Legal question. 
Depends upon what the statute says and the rules say. It's not subject to an 
opinion on that point" P 98 line 24 thru P 99 line 2 
Judge replied: "I think the question was put to the witness in the capacity as an 
Expert Witness and I think she can answer to the extent she understands the 
question." P 99, lines 3-6 
2nd Objection - "Then I object because she has not been qualified in that 
area" P 99, lines 7-8 
Judge replied "I think she was being offered as one, is she not, Miss 
Lima?" P 99, lines 9-10 
Lima says: "She is" P 99, line 11 
3rd Objection - "I beg your pardon, Judge. She was offered"[?] - "she was 
not offered, but I guess she is now" [being offered] "as a qualified expert 
on home health nurs[ing]." [editing added to clarify Atty Jepson's shock 
and surprise and reply to Judge's action of offering the witness himself as 
an expert] 
Judge replied, "I think that's what she is here to testify - p 99, lines 15-16 
Further Objection - "Yeah. The question here is where the legal duty lies 
as to who makes what determination and I think we can - " P 99, lines 17-19 
Judge replies: "The question was put in the context of a home health nurse and the 
question, as I recall it, was does the home health care nurse have the authority to 
decide when or how to administer controlled substances." 
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4th Objection - "Exactly. And the word authority means nurses are 
controlled by statute and regulations and so the proper question should be, 
if it's asked, what is the statute or where is the regulation and what does it 
say, not do you have an opinion about what the law is, so I maintain my 
objection P 99, line 25 thru P 100, line5 
Judge replied: I think the witness can answer the question and the source and the 
basis for her answer can then be explored and then I'll allow it. . P 100, lines 6-8 
Witness: If I understand the question correctly, are you asking me if a pharmacist 
prescribes - or if a physician prescribes a medication for a patient is there any 
reason why I don't think that patient should have that medication?P 100, lines 9-13 
Ms. Lima: Yes P 100, line 14 
5th Objection - "Objection. That is not what the question was. The 
question was a determination of authority to act, not what her opinion 
is." P 100, lines 15-17 
Note: The Judge did not rule he accepted Baker as an expert witness or that she was an 
expert, just that he would allow her to testify and the basis of her testimony could be 
explored. Jepson never accepted her as an expert but rather continued to object that she 
was not a qualified expert. A 6th Objection about Baker's lack of qualifications came at 
the end of Baker's testimony on page 136, lines 3-5, concerning which objection - the 
Judge simply ignored it. 
Ms. Lima: rephrased her question re standard of care to be "does a nurse have 
any say as to whether or not the family can retain the drug?" P 100 
Ans: "Well the nurse — the person probably wouldn't be accepted for home health 
unless it was a safe situation" ... her answers included: p 100-101 
"If I felt like it was a safe situation..." p 101, line 3 
"My job would be ..." P 101, line 6 
"If I was concerned and felt like..." . P 101, line 7 
"I would involve ..." P 101, line 8 
"...who I was working ..." P 101, line 9 
Miss Lima: "Who decides if a controlled substance should be wasted in a home 
health care setting?" P 101, lines 12-13 
Ans: "I think it would be up to the nurse and the family." P 101, line 14 
Asked about standard of care in wasting a controlled substance. Reply was that 
"You would like to have somebody watch you ..." P 101, line 18 
Discussed process of wasting - answer included "I would have ..." . . P 101 line 7 
Discussed making a wasting record - answer included, "I think as a nurse I would 
want to record that just to cover myself..." P 102, lines 20-21 
Asked where such a record typically be kept? Ans: "Probably in the patient's 
Page 8 of 12 
record and perhaps in a log..." P 103, lines 1-2 
Discussed whether there was a written "concern" in Mortensen's record which was 
answered in the negative P 104 
Discussed which nursing notes Baker had reviewed P 104-105 
Objection on two grounds - as to the question about charting and the 
whole line of charting questioning because there is no allegation in the 
petition about failure to properly chart and further objection to expanding 
the pleaded issues P 105 at line 5 thru P 106, line 22 
Judge Ruled: "THERE ISN'T ANY CLAIM THAT I SEE IN THIS 
PETITION ABOUT FAILURE TO DOCUMENT IN THE CHARTS AND 
THAT'S NOT AN ISSUE BEFORE THE 
BOARD." P 106, lines 19-21 
Ms. Lima again asked if any recording or mention of any concern by Jepson 
concerning safety or well being ~ answered in the negative p 107 
Ms. Lima asked if Baker had ever taken a controlled substance to her home -
answered in the negative P 107 
Ms. Lima asked if any recording in the notes of wasting P 108 
Ms. Lima asked if any documentation of morphine prescription - answered in the 
negative P 108 
Ms. Lima asked if any recording in the documents of Duragesic patches -
answered in the negative P 108 
Discussion with counsel and Judge about Baker's report P 108-109 
Ms. Lima asked again if it is important to document medication P 108 
X-Examination - Scott Jepson 
Charting discussed P I 10-111 
Detailed discussion of Oasis Recertification Medication sheet and Jepson's 
charting of the Morphine in section 485 of it P 111-114 
Detailed discussion about case conferences and reporting concerns to case 
managers P I 14-117, line 4 
Baker asked about her opinion that all prescribed medication need to be left in the 
home. She answered, "If the medication is ordered for a patient, it should be in 
their home." P 117, lines 6 -11 
Jepson read Controlled Substances Act Rule R156-37-502(4) to Baker and asked if 
a controlled substance were left in the patient's home, whether he as a nurse could 
possibly have control over it. She answered: "You wouldn't leave it there if it 
wasn't a safe situation." P 117 line 12 thru P 118 line 7 
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Jepson then asked again whether he could have control over a medication left in a 
patient's home and Baker answered, "Yes." P 118, lines 8-11 
Background: Clinical experience was back in 1993 - ans: "That's Correct" p 118 
Asked about where she worked and what lype of patients she worked with 
and she replied "Medicine and oncology." P 118, lines 17-24 
Q: Okay. So you have had some experience administering morphine? 
A: At the time I was an L.P.N., so very little. 
Q: Rarely? 
A: And usually it was LM. 
Q: Did you ever administer I.V. morphine? 
A: No. 
Q: Okay. And then since then, you have not had positions or — you haven't had 
any kind of position where you would have exposure to being required to 
administer I.V. morphine, correct? 
A: Nope. 
Q: So your testimony is that you have no experience in administration or 
control of I.V. morphine? 
A: No. 
Q: Thank you. 
Mr. Arron Jepson: No, means no experience? 
The Witness: Right P 118, line 25 thru P 119, line 17 
X-Examination - Arron Jepson 
Questioned Baker about Oasis Medication sheet - she admitted she did not have 
the current medication sheet from the Oasis Recertification, that she couldn't have 
reviewed it, and said, "I don't know" when asked, "So you don't know whether 
the medication was actually charted by Scott Jepson on that sheet 
or not, do you? p 120, line 2 thru P 121, line 2 
Questioned about statutory language in the reporting statute containing the 
wording "reason to believe." and dictionary definition of the 
word "reason" P 121, line 3 thru P 122, line 20 
Questioned about Baker's reference to "suspected" and dictionary definition of the 
word "suspicion" P 122, line 21 thru P 125, line 6 
Questioned re duty to educate and hospital setting which Baker said was "a 
different setting P 125, line 7 thru P 127, line 10 
Questioned Baker about her reference to safety - "it's never been an issue" and 
leaving a 300mg, 20ml flask of morphine in the house. She answered, "If it wasn't 
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a safe situation I wouldn't be in there taking care of the 
patient." P 127, line 13 thru P 128, line 7 
Continued X-Examination - Scott Jepson 
Questioned Baker about unit dose vials and Baker answered: 
"I can't answer." P 128-129 
Questioned Baker again about his (Jepson's) ability to maintain control of the 
morphine if he left it in the patient's home and hypothetically a relative of the 
patient brings her boyfriend in the home, with a drug addiction, and he stole the 
morphine -
"Would I have any personal ability to prevent that? 
Ans: No p 129 - 130, line 5 
Re-Direct Examination - Cheryl Luke 
Prosecution redirect examination was thoroughly confusing, repetitive, and asked 
one speculative question after another calling for speculative answers: For 
example: shelf live of morphine, whether a prescription should match the needs of 
a patient, what would have happened if Scott Jepson had been in a car accident; 
are Duragesic patches and Lortabs addictive medications, whether Jepson has been 
involved in Baker's past nursing experiences with liquid morphine; could the 
morphine have been given directly to the family without Jepson's involvement; is 
pain management an issue in home health; do doctor's order combinations of 
drugs; why can Duragesic patches and morphine be given together; could some 
other form of liquid morphine have been used; does not putting her on the 
Duragesic patch and not giving her the morphine address the problem of not being 
able to swallow tablets; can a combination of Duragesic patch and morphine be 
fatal; P 130, line 10 thru P 136 line 2 
6th Objection — to Baker's unqualified testimony — "Objection. She has 
already clearly stated that she doesn't have the background in 
administering narcotics to have any expert testimony." P 136, lines 3-4 
Judge: ignored objection 
Luke continued: Asked Baker if she has used Fentanyl patches. Ans: "I have used 
the patch." P 136, line 8 
... can Lortab or Fentanyl patches be fatal if overdosed; if a facility had no wasting 
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form what would be the nursing practice that you think meet minimum 
standards P 136, lines 15-19 
Ans: "I would have a competent witness." P 136, line 19 
Objection - there is no minimum - only one standard P 136, lines 20-24 
Judge - tell witness - not to answer on basis of a minimum -just as to the standard 
of care P 136, Line 25 thru P 137, line 2 
Luke continued: where would be appropriate place to make an entry; time period 
in which a note should be made - Baker answered -
"I would do it right there" P 137 
Re-X-Examination - Scott Jepson 
Would you do it right there if there were no witness? Ans: "I wouldn't want to do 
it without a witness." P 138 
Can you sign a document - waste sheet - that doesn't exist? Ans: I don't believe 
so." P 138 
Questions by Board: 
Miss Forster-Burke: See any specific policies or manual for First Choice? Ans: 
No, I haven't seen the policy and procedure manual P139 
If nurse has "concerns" might he call anyone besides social worker? Ans: Maybe 
the Director of Nursing P 139-140 
Documentation of concerns is done where? Ans: communication log P 140 
A time that would be obeyed as far as standard of care to do charting? P 140 
PROSECUTION RESTED -
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Tab 8 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 8 
Prosecution's Burden of Proof 
Charging Language & Required Elements of Statutes under Counts I & III 
DOPL PETITION - COUNT I 
"Respondent possessed controlled substances outside of his responsibilities as 
a nurse." 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i), UCA Prohibited Acts - Penalties 
(2) It is unlawful: 
for any person 
knowingly and intentionally 
to possess or use 
a controlled substance, 
UNLESS 
it was obtained 
under a valid prescription or order, 
directly from a practitioner 
while acting in the course of his professional practice 
or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
58-31 b-502 (5), UCA Unprofessional Conduct 
Unprofessional conduct includes 
(5) unlawfully 
obtaining, possessing, or using 
a prescription drug or illicit drug; 
58-1-501 (2)(a), UCA Unlawful & Unprofessional Conduct 
(2) Unprofessional conduct means 
conduct by a licensee 
that is defined as unprofessional conduct 
under this title or under any rule adopted under this title 
and includes: 
(a) violating, ©r-
aiding, or abetting any other person 
to violate 
any statute, rule, or order 
DOPL PETITION - COUNT III 
"Respondent failed to produce a medication he purchased for a patient. 
Therefore, Respondent engaged in unprofessional conduct as defined in:" 
58-31 b-502(7), UCA Unprofessional Conduct 
Unprofessional conduct includes 
(7) unauthorized 
taking or personal use of 
a patient's personal property; 
Tab 9 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 9 
Two Jury Instructions given to Board/Jury 
Instruction No. 
Ownership of a Narcotic 
A Schedule II Narcotic, prescribed for a patient, becomes the 
personal property of the patient at that point in time when the narcotic is 
delivered into the physical possession of the patient. 
Argument for the adoption and giving of this Instruction 
Public policy and present wide spread practice in the medical field, among Doctors and Nurses, 
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (hereafter JCAHO), Drug 
Enforcement Agency (hereafter DEA) rules and regulations, referred to by JCAHO and Utah laws 
and rules, and the State of Utah Controlled Substances Act and Rules are uniform in the 
requirements of licensed doctors and nurses maintaining strict controls over Schedule II 
controlled substances such that said unused or partially used narcotics be wasted, not given to the 
patient That this is a correct statement of the law or what the law should be, is proven by the 
daily customary administration, handling, and disposition of Schedule II narcotics, including 
Morphine, in hospital and other nursing care situations statewide, where, for example, as here, an 
unused vile of morphine, prescribed for a patient, is taken by the nurse and wasted, although the 
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patient has paid for or has been or will be charged for and will pay for the said narcotic. This 
Court is asked to take judicial notice of this fact. If the law were contrary to this, DOPL would be 
flooded with complaints from every patient for the unlawful taking of his/her narcotic whose 
unused medication is wasted. 
Furthermore, if the law were contrary to the above, meaning that a narcotic would become 
the personal property of a patient upon being billed for or upon the patient, or patient's family, 
paying for the narcotic, then every single wasting by any nurse of any schedule II narcotic which 
has been prescribed but unused or partially used, would be an unlawful taking of a patient's 
personal property and a violation of §58-31b-502(7) UCA. That would be an untenable and 
impractical situation, which runs diametrically opposed to every day practice, and to the DEA and 
Utah State Controlled Substances Act and Rules requirements, as I am coming to understand 
them. 
For example, an unused portion of Morphine is not given to a patient leaving the hospital 
to take home in the event he thinks or feels he might need it at some future point in time, whether 
an hour, day, week or month. Delivery of the narcotic into the physical possession of the patient is 
the clear demarcation line between owning the narcotic and not owning it. This goes along with 
the common saying that possession is nine tenths of the law. In most, if not all cases, certainly in 
this case, it is the correct statement of the law. I could find no model instruction on this point but 
respectfully urge the adoption of this instruction in this case. This instruction is consistent with 
both Federal and State law requirements and the current widespread Medical, Hospital, Home 




That which in the constitution and course of nature or the law, no 
man can do or perform. . . 
Impossibility is of the following several sorts: 
An act is physically impossible when it is contrary to the course of 
nature. Such an impossibility may be either absolute, i.e. impossible in 
any case, (e.g., to stop earth rotation) or relative, (sometimes called 
"impossibility in fact,") i.e. arising from the circumstances of the case 
(e.g., for A. to make a payment to B., he being a deceased person.) 
Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, p. 889 
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Tab 10 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 10 
Ex Post Facto 
The classic definition by the U.S. Supreme court of Ex Post Facto is found 
in the case of Calderv. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 3 Dall 386, 386, 1 L Ed. 648 (1798) . A 
later modification was made which defined an ex post facto law as one which in 
its operation, makes that criminal which was not so at the time the action was 
performed, or which increases the punishment, or, in short, which, in relation to 
the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his detriment or 
disadvantage. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 53 L. Ed. 2nd 344 
(1977) and following cases. See generally 16B Am Jur 2nd §646- 670 and §671 
on Bills of Attainder. See also 16A C.J.S. §409. One of the purposes of the 
constitutional prohibition against enactment of ex post facto laws is to ensure that 
the accused individual receives fair notice of the crime and its punishment (16A 
C.J.S. §409). 
"...the notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which 
will give rise to criminal penalties - is fundamental to our concept of constitutional 
liberty and as such, is protected against judicial action by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment." (16B Am Jur 2d § 647, page 130.) 
Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective... (ib, §645, p 
126) 
Tab 11 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 11 
Admission by DOPL's Attorney - Karl Perry 
Nurse Baker gave Personal Opinion Testimony 
...M.S'. Baker could testify as to how she would act or handle different 
situations as posed to her, (Standard of Care). That is how questions were 
posed to her by the division and is how she answered many of the 
hypothetical and factual questions. 
(see DOPL's Memorandum Opposing Request for Agency 
Review, dated February 13, 2004, p. 17, paragraph 2, lines 
11-14; see Record on Appeal p. 89) 
Tab 12 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 12 
37 References - "Lethal" dose or volume of Morphine 
April Transcript — 10 references 
151:2, 12,20; 152:25; 158:14; 176:22; 195:5, 10,12; 245:4 
May Transcript — 24 references 
15:2, 5; 33:13; 38:17; 39:11; 40:8; 41:1, 4; 45:3, 5; 80:7; 90:3; 105:20; 
106:12; 110:4; 120:16; 126:22; 128:16, 17; 175:4, 12, 16; 178:20; 182:8 
DOPL Findings, Conclusions, and Order (Record p. 182) - 3 references 
"Excessive dosage and concentration of the morphine" - 5:1-2; 7:17-18 
"Lethal" 12:9-11 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 13 
Definitions & Synonyms 
PRODUCE 
The word "produce" is defined as: to bring forth; to present for inspection; 
cause to appear; write; to bear, yield; to give birth to; and so forth (see The New 
Lexicon Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, Lexicon 
Publications, Inc. New York, 1990, p. 798). The synonyms for the word produce are: 
create, engender, father, generate, hatch, make, originate, parent, procreate, sire, 
and spawn (see Roget'sII the New Thesaurus, Houghton Mifflin company, Boston, 
Mass., 1980, p 722). 
As clearly seen, neither the definition nor any synonym for the word produce 
means "deliver," certainly not "deliver into the possession of another." The word 
produce is not a legal term of art. It is an ordinary English word, the definition and 
meaning of which can be gleaned from an English dictionary and from its synonyms, 
which can be found in a common Thesaurus. 
AVAILABLE 
"Available" means capable of being obtained, obtainable. Its synonyms are: 
attainable, disponible, gettable, procurable, (see Roget 's II the New Thesaurus, 
Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, Mass., 1980, p 722; see also The New Lexicon 
Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, Lexicon Publications, Inc. 
New York, 1990, p. 798). 
TOOK & TAKE 
Took is past tense of Take. Take means to get possession of by using force or 
superior strength; to steal or remove without right, The New Lexicon Webster's 
Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language, Lexicon Publications, New York, 
1990; 
A "taking" occurs when a person with a preconceived design to appropriate 
property to his own use obtains possession of it by means of fraud or trickery. People v 
Edwards, 72 Cal. App. 102, 236 P. 944, 948, Blacks Law Dictionary, revised 4th edition, 
1968, p 1625. 
Tab 14 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 14 
Findings and Conclusions Regarding Jepson's Intent 
DOPL 
"...Respondent acted with good intentions. . . there is no evidence of any 
potential or actual injury . . . Respondent generally provided good nursing 
care . . . an isolated incident. . . it is not likely Respondent would repeat 
that conduct. . . Respondent has not been previously subject to any 
disciplinary licensure action. . . rather unique facts of this case. (See DOPL 
ORDER pp. 12-13; Record p. 192-193) [emphasis added] 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ON REVIEW 
The Beckstroms testified that Petitioner [Jepson] was a good nurse and that 
he took appropriate care of Ms. Mortensen; the only concern they had was 
that the morphine was not available for Ms. Mortensen if she later needed 
it. The Division found that Petitioner had no intention to injure Ms. 
Mortensen, and she was not in fact injured; she did not need the morphine 
that he kept and later destroyed. At all times, his intentions were to 
comply with the law and the standard of care for home health nurses, 
not to violate them. Furthermore, Petitioner has no record of any prior 
disciplinary actions during his many years as a licensed registered nurse. 
[emphasis added] 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 15 
From Jepson Principle Brief to Dept. Of Commerce, pp 17-18 
Record p. 114-115 
Jack Branin's Eye Witness Testimony ~ Wasting of Morphine 
Branin testified: (AT) 
"I would figure I'm competent" (Supra, P. 213. Line 4). Branin testified he 
knew the wasting was concerning a morphine vial (supra, p. 207 lines7-8); 
that it was a narcotic (p. 209, lines 21-23); that he was shown the label on 
the vial (p. 210, lines 10-11); that he physically handled the vial (p. 210, line 
11); that he looked at and examined the vial (p, 210, lines 15-16); that the 
glass was amber in color (p. 210, lines 19-21); that he looked at it and 
handled it and handed it back to Jepson (p. 211, lines 4-6); that he saw 
Jepson flip off the metal top with his thumb (p. 211, lines 7-11); that he 
watched as Jepson used a hypodermic needle, put it into the bottle and 
squirted it down the sink and could see the liquid was gone (p. 211, lines 
12-23); that he witnessed the wasting and was advised he would have to 
sign a form from Jepson's company (p 212, 7-14). 
Further, concerning an interview by DOPL, Branin testified in answer to a 
question whether he didn't pay much attention to the label, that he remembered handling 
the vial and could not remember whether it has 20 or 15 [ml] because the quantity didn't 
matter to him, and that, because it was such a large vial of Morphine and was different 
than the ones that soldiers warmed in their mouths during the Korean War, he "took the 
vial," and "handled it," and "looked at it." Then he explained his comment about not 
paying too much attention as meaning, 
...inasmuch as I didn Jt read it as carefully as I would if I were taking a 
prescription myself , but I felt confident that - that what he told me he was 
getting rid of is exactly what I was looking at because, you know, like I 
said, initially the whole idea of morphine to me was this small thing a 
medic could have in his mouth, (p 214, lines 1-25, and p. 215, lines 1-20); 
Then again on redirect Branin testified: that he did see the word morphine on the 
vial label (p. 216, lines 22-25); that he took it and looked at it and had the vial [bottle] 
and that he looked at it, and looked at the numbers and that, it was quite clear that it said 
morphine, yes. (p. 217 lines 1-8). 
I objected at trial to the prosecutor's attempt to mis-characterize Branin's 
testimony to be that he didn't read the label (see transcript p. 214, lines 11-19). Branin's 
testimony before and after that objection was consistent and unimpeached. His credibility 
was not challenged, nor was the fact disputed that he testified from personal eye-witness 
knowledge. There was only one failed attempt by the prosecutor to mis-characterize 
Branin's testimony. That failed attempt does not constitute "substantial evidence" 
necessary to support the Judge/Board's conclusion that witness Branin did not know what 
was in the vial. There was absolutely no basis for that conclusion. Mr. Branin's entire 
testimony demonstrates he knew what was in the vial. The Judge/Board's conclusion to 
the contrary is not based upon substantial or any evidence. It must be stricken and 
reversed consistent with the unimpeached, uncontested, undisputed, and overwhelming 
evidence that Branin knew what was in the vial, and was therefore a competent witness. 
His testimony also agrees with Jepson's testimony on the same issue. 
That the Court should reverse the Judge/Board's conclusion that Branin was not a 
competent witness is further buttressed by several other things: 
(1) both Counts II and IV, which allege there was no proper witness and no 
witness, respectively, were unconditionally dismissed after trial; (2) there 
was no Petition allegation raising an issue about competency of a witness, 
and therefore that was not a justiciable issue at trial; (3) Branin was a 
witness, testified at trial, and whom the Judge/Board believed was present 
at the wasting; (4) neither Branin's nor Jepson's testimony on this issue was 
impeached, contested, disputed, nor rebutted in any way, (5) there was no 
Rule, Statute, or Order cited in the petition as having been violated by 
Jepson concerning the lack of or the lack of competency of a witness to a 
wasting, and thus it was not a justiciable issue at trial; and (6) there is no 
evidence to support it, making said conclusion by the Judge/Board not only 
unsupported by substantial evidence but totally contrary to the evidence. 
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Security of Other Medications and Supplies 
The Joint Commission has recently revised its interpretation of 
medication security, from one of "strict11 security of prescription 
medications to one of "reasonable" security, in an effort to get 
surveyors to address areas that have a higher impact on patient 
safety. 
Q: Do all prescription and non-prescription drugs need to be 
secure? 
(New Interpretation) 
A: Yes. How secure depends on the classification of the 
medication as a "controlled substance" or not. Certainly all 
Schedule II controlled substances (narcotics) need to be secure 
under lock and key based on DEA laws and regulations 
(standard TX.3.4). Although most states no longer require a 
"double-lock" system, these products must be stored in a 
"substantially constructed locked cabinet". In addition, these 
drugs must be tightly controlled and accounted for, under law 
and regulation. 
For other drugs and products, we expect that the products be 
"reasonably secure" to prevent diversion or tampering with the 
products. These products do not need to be locked. However, 
they should not be kept in areas that are readily accessible to 
public and easily removed by visitors. For example, prescription 
medications left in an unlocked drawer in a patient waiting area 
or patient examination room would not be considered secure. 
However, if regular prescription medications are kept in a private 
office, or other area where patients and visitors are not allowed 
without supervision or presence of a healthcare professional 
(e.g. ambulatory infusion) they are considered secure, even if not 
locked. All areas restricted to authorized personnel only are 
considered "secure" areas. 
The security of prescription medications should be addressed in 
your organization's security management plan (standard 
EC. 1.4). As part of this plan, theft, pilferage and tampering 
should be reported. If medication security becomes a problem, it 
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LORRIE LIMA (USB 5872) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (USB 4666) 
Attorney General 
Division of Commercial Enforcement 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
PO Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 
Telephone: (801) 366-0521 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF 
W. SCOTT JEPSON, R.N. 
TO PRACTICE AS A REGISTERED NURSE 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
P E T I T I O N 
Case No. DOPL-2002-151 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
These claims were investigated by the Utah Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing (Division) upon complaint that W. Scott Jepson, R.N.. (Respondent) has engaged in 
acts and practices which constitute violations of the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-1-101 to 58-1-503 (1998), the Nurse Practice Act 
§§ 58-31b-101 to 58-31b-402 (1998), the Controlled Substances Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-




1. The Division is a division of the Utah Department of Commerce pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 13-l-2(2)(a) and 58-1-103 (1998). 
2. Respondent is licensed by the Division to practice as a registered nurse pursuant to 
the Nurse Practice Act. Respondent was licensed at all times material to the allegations 
contained herein. 
STATEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS 
3. a. Respondent was employed as a home health nurse for 1st Choice Home Care in 
Provo, Utah. 
b. Respondent was temporarily assigned to provide home nursing care to patient H.M. 
(name withheld for confidentiality), an elderly, disabled adult. 
c. On or about April 11, 2002 Respondent was nursing H.M. Respondent determined 
that H.M. was unable to swallow her medications. Respondent suggested to H.M.'s family that 
it consider alternative pain management medications for H.M. The family agreed and 
Respondent telephoned H.M.'s physician. The physician issued two prescriptions: (1) Duragesic 
patches, which contains fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled substance, and (2) an injectable 
morphine sulfate, a Schedule II controlled substance. Respondent picked up the prescriptions at 
the physician's office and he took them to a pharmacy for filling. The pharmacy was unable to 
fill the prescription for morphine sulphate. Respondent retained the morphine sulphate 
prescription. Respondent told H.M.'s family that he would get the prescription filled and deliver 
the drug to H.M. later that same evening. 
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d. Respondent took the prescription for morphine sulphate to another pharmacy. 
However, the pharmacy was unable to package the moiphine sulphate in the quantity the 
prescription required. Respondent traveled back to the prescribing physician's office and 
obtained a prescription by a physician for the morphine sulphate in the quantity available at the 
pharmacy. Respondent had the prescription filled at the pharmacy and paid for the medication 
and administration supplies from his own funds. 
e. Respondent telephoned H.M.'s family and informed it that he would deliver the 
morphine sulphate the following day. 
f. On or about April 12, 2002 Respondent informed H.M.'s family that he had 
destroyed the morphine sulphate and that he could not turn it over to them because it would be 
illegal distribution of a controlled substance. 
g. On April 30, 2002 Respondent told a Division investigator that he took H.M.'s 
medication to his home and he stored it in the refrigerator. Respondent stated that he destroyed 
the medication without a witness. Respondent stated that he was concerned H.M.'s family was 
attempting to euthanize H.M. with the medication. 
h. Respondent did not ask H.M.'s physician to withdraw the morphine sulfate 
prescription. Respondent did not report his suspicions regarding H.M. and her family to any 
physician, local law enforcement or state agency. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
4. The Division may discipline the license of any licensee as follows: 
(a) the licensee or applicant has engaged in unprofessional conduct as defined by statute 
or rule under this title. 
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(b) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unlawful conduct as defined by statute or rule 
under this title. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-l-401(2)(a) and (b) (1998). 
5. Unprofessional conduct is defined by statute to include: 
(a) violating, or aiding or abetting any other person to violate any statute, rule, or order 
regulating an occupation or profession under this title; 
(g) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession regulated under this 
title through gross incompetence, gross negligence, or a pattern of incompetency or 
negligence; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1-501 (2)(a)and (g) (1998). 
6. Unprofessional conduct is further defined by statute as follows: 
(5) unlawfully obtaining, possessing, or using any prescription drug or illicit drug; 
(7) unauthorized taking or personal use of patient's personal property. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-31b-502(5) and (7) (1998). 
7. Unprofessional conduct is defined by administrative rule as follows: 
(4) failing to maintain controls over controlled substances which would be considered by 
a prudent practitioner to be effective against diversion, theft, or shortage of controlled 
substances; 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE Rl56-37-502(4) (2002). 
8. Unlawful conduct is defined by statute to as follows: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance, 
unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner 
while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this 
subsection. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998). 
9. A nurse has a statutory responsibility when providing nursing care to elderly or 
disabled patients as follows: 
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(1) Any person, including but not limited to, a social worker, physician, psychologist, 
nurse, teacher, or employee of a private or public facility serving adults, who has reason 
to believe that any disabled or elder adult has been the subject of abuse, emotional or 
psychological abuse, neglect, or exploitation shall immediately notify the nearest peace 
officer, law enforcement agency, or local office of Adult Protective Services within the 
Department of Human Services, Division of Aging and Adult Services. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-1 ll.l(l)(2)(a)(i) (1998). 
10. The Division has the authority to assess administrative fines as follows: 
(1) After proceeding pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, 
and Title 58, Chapter 1, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, the 
division may impose administrative penalties of up to $10,000 for unprofessional 
conduct or unlawful conduct under this chapter. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-31b-402(l) (1998). 
COUNT I 
11. Paragraphs 1 through 10 are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth. 
12. Respondent possessed controlled substances outside of his responsibilities as a nurse. 
Therefore, Respondent engaged in unlawful and unprofessional conduct as defined in UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(l), 58-31b-502(5) and 58-l-501(2)(a) establishing grounds to 
sanction his license pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-l-401(2)(a) and (b) and to impose an 
administrative fine pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-31b-402(l). 
COUNT II 
13. Paragraphs 1 through 10 are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 
14. Respondent failed to administer medication to his patient as prescribed by a 
physician. Respondent maintained a patient's narcotics medication at his residence and he 
disposed of a controlled substance without a proper witness as is standard practice in nursing. 
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Respondent failed to report his suspicion that the patient may be a victim of abuse or potential 
abuse per his legal obligation m UTAH CODE ANN § 76-11 1(1) Therefore, Respondent 
engaged in unprofessional conduct as defined m UTAH CCDE ANN §§ 58-l-502(2)(g) 
establishing grounds to sanction his license pursuant to UI AH CODE ANN § 58-l-401(2)(a) and 
to impose an administrative fine pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN § 58-31b-402(l) 
COUNT III 
15 Paragraphs 1 through 10 are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth heiem 
16 Respondent failed to produce a medication he purchased for a patient Therefore, 
Respondent engaged m unprofessional conduct as defined m UTAH CODE ANN § 58-31b-502(7) 
establishing grounds to sanction his license pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN § 58-l-401(2)(a) and 
to impose an administrative fine pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN § 58-3 lb-402(l) 
COUNT IV 
17 Paragraphs 1 through 10 are incorporated by leference as if fully set foith herein 
18 Respondent maintained a controlled substance at his home and he destroyed the 
medication without a witness Therefore, Respondent engaged in unprofessional conduct as 
defined in UTAH ADMIN CODE Rl 56-37-502(4) establ shing grounds to sanction his license 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN § 58-l-401(2)(a) and to impose an administrative fine pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN § 58-31b-402(l) 
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief 
1 That Respondent be adjudged and decieed to have engaged m the acts alleged herein, 
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2. That by engaging in the above acts Respondent be adjudged and decreed to have 
violated the above-referenced statutes and rule of the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing Act, the Nurse Practice Act, the Controlled Substances Act and the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act Rules; 
3. That an order be issued imposing an appropriate sanction against Respondent's 
license to practice as a registered nurse in Utah. 
4. That an appropriate administrative fine be assessed against Respondent. 
DATED this 1st day of July, 2002. 
. ; : 
LORRJE LIMA, 
Assistant Attorney General 
-7-
yn 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
: ss. 
) 
On this ^ day of July, 2002 Shane Tiernan personally appeared before me, and 
after being duly sworn and deposed, says that he has read the foregoing petition and he knows the 
contents thereof and the same is true to the best of his knowledge, except as to matters stated on 
information and belief, and that as to those matters he believes them to be true. 
s.NE TIERNAN, 
Investigator 
Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this ^S_ day of July, 2002. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KIM LESH 








I hereby certify that on the <3 day of July, 2002, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF AGENCY ACTION 
and PETITION was sent first class mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
W. SCOTT JEPSON 
654 W 650 S 
OREM UT 84058 
l/~Wv ZJ^L 
Lm Lesh 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S e c r e t a r y 
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Tab 18 
' :• •'• " T-QI 1A I A ND PROFESSIONAI » I .ICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
CHI r i l l > ! , ' ! T , I ' I ' I ' I I«" UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF 
W. SCOTT JEPSON, RN 
TO PRACTICE AS A 
REGISTERED NURSE 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH :Case No. DOPL-2G02-151 
The attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Order are hereby adopted by the Regulatory and 
Compliance Officer of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing of the State of Utah. 
Dated this l(oTJt day of June, 2003. 
W. Ray V^lker 
Regulatory and Compliance 
Officer 
Agency review of this Order may be obtained by filing a 
request for agency review with the Executive Director, Department 
of Commerce, within thirty (30) days after the date of this 
Order. The laws and rules governing agency review are found in 
Section 63~46b-12 of the Utah Code, and Section R151-46b-12 of 
the Utah Administrative Code. 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL ANT PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF : FINDINGS OF FACT 
W. SCOTT JEPSON, RN : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
TO PRACTICE AS A REGISTERED NURSE : AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH : Case No. DOPL-2002-151 
Appearances: 
L o m e Lima and Cheryl D. Luke for the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing 
Arron F. Jepson for Respondent 
BY THE BOARD: 
An April 25, 2003 hearing was conducted in the above-
entitled proceeding before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law 
Judge for the Department of Commerce, and the Board of Nursing. 
Board members present were Linda Cornaby Helen Zsohar, Theresa 
M. Rock, Marilyn Johnson, Lynn F. Price, Bernadette Bittner, 
Sandra Lookmland and Diane Forster-Burke. The remaining Board 
members (Steven R. McColley and Cathy C. Hadden) were not 
present. There is currently one vacancy on the Board. 
J. Craig Jackson, Director of the Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing, was not present. Given his absence, 
Mr. Jackson designated W. Ray Walker as the presiding officer to 
review and act upon the Recommended Order submitted by the Board 
in this proceeding. 
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. The April 
25, 2003 hearing was adjourned on that date and resumed on May 
30, 2003 Further evidence was then.offered and received and the 
hearing concluded on that date. 
The Board now enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and submits the following Recommended Order for review and 
action by the Division: 
I-11 iiDLNLi:.! 11i'11 ill'1 At r 
1. Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this 
proceeding has bee: icensed t : practice as a registered. i 11 irse 
in this state. Division licensing records reflect that 
Respondent became so licensed March 25, 1991. Respondent was 
employed as a home health nurse for First Choice Home Health from 
June 2001 through September 2002. 
2. Respondent was temporarily assigned to provide home 
nursing care to Hazel Mortensen, an elderly disabled adult. 
Respondent initially provided nursing care to Ms. Mortensen 
commencing April 5, 2002. Ms. Mortensen resided with Karen and 
Garth Beckstr^m <"l> > • ' ' M< >rtensei i"s dai lgl iter ai id soi i i i i 1 aw. 
3. Respondent returned to the Beckstrom's home on April 
2002 and he determined that Ms. Mortensen was not able to swallow 
her medications at that time. Respondent then suggested to the 
Beckstroms that they consider alternative pain management 
medications for Ms. Mortensen Mr. and r Irs Beckstrom agreed with 
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Respondent's assessment. 
4. Respondent then contacted Dr. Erik Hogensen, who was 
Ms. Mortensen's attending physician. Based on Respondent's 
assessment of Ms. Mortensen, Dr. Hogensen issued prescriptions 
for Duragesic patches, a Schedule II controlled substance 
containing fentanyl, and injectable morphine sulphate, also a 
Schedule II controlled substance. 
5. Respondent and Mr. Beckstrom obtained those 
prescriptions at Dr. Hogensen's office and they proceeded to a 
pharmacy to obtain the medications. The pharmacist filled the 
Duragesic prescription. However, the morphine sulphate 
prescription could not be filled in the multi-unit dosage for 
which it had been written. 
6. Respondent attempted to locate multi-unit dose morphine 
sulphate vials at other hospitals or pharmacies. However, he was 
not able to obtain that medication for Ms. Mortensen as 
prescribed by Dr. Hogensen. Respondent and Mr. Beckstrom 
returned to the Beckstrom1s home. 
7. Respondent then contacted B & H Pharmacy, which was also 
not able to dispense the morphine sulphate in the prescribed 
multi-unit doses. However, that pharmacy had morphine sulphate 
available in a 20ml with 15mg/ml vial. Mr. Beckstrom gave 
Respondent $26.00 to pay for the morphine sulphate. 
8. Respondent then returned to Dr. Hogensen's office and 
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obtained a prescription from a Dr. James Rose for the morphine 
sulphate in the quantity available at B & H Pharmacy. Respondent 
then had Ms. Mortensen's prescription filled at that pharmacy at 
approximately 8:00 p.m. on April 11, 
9. There is a lack of sufficient and credible evidence 
that Respondent told the Beckstroms tl lat 1 i€ • A oi il I get tl le 
prescription filled and deliver Ms. Mortensen's medication to 
tl lei i i. :>i i tl le e v ei :i i i lg : f Ap:i i ] 1 3 2 0 02 Respondent: proceeded., to 
his home with the morphine sulphate. There is also a lack of 
sufficient credible evidence to find that Respondent 
contacted the Beckstroms by telephone that evening and informed 
them that he would deliver the morphine sulphate on the following 
day. 
10. Ms. Mortensen's condition had improved on April 12, 
2002 ai id the Beckstroi ns thus believed that the morphine si llphate 
was no longer necessary. Based on the substantial and credible 
evidence presented, " Beckstrom left a telephonic message for 
Respondent, thus instructing him not to have the morphine 
sulphate prescription filled if he had not yet obtained that 
medication for Ms. Mortensen. 
11. Respondent arrived at the Beckstrom home approximately 
15 i i ni i n ites ] a t: 32 : • I I- : i nformed tl ie Beckstrc 1 1 is tl lat 1 :i s 1 1,5 i 
obtained the morphine sulphate and he had left that medication at 
i I I sspc 1 idei it , 3 assessment: of Ms Mortens^* - • n 
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was consistent with that of the Beckstroms. Given the excessive 
dosage and concentration of the morphine sulphate which 
Respondent had obtained from B & H Pharmacy, he had elected not 
to leave Ms. Mortensen's medication in the Beckstrom's home. 
12. Respondent returned to the Beckstrom's home on April 
13, 2002. Based on the substantial and credible evidence 
presented, Mrs. Beckstrom inquired whether Respondent had the 
morphine sulphate with him. Respondent replied that he could not 
provide that medication to them because it would be an illegal 
distribution of a controlled substance and he had destroyed the 
morphine sulphate. 
13. Based on the substantial evidence presented and the 
more reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, Respondent elected to 
dispose of the morphine sulphate at his residence. However, that 
disposal occurred in the presence of a witness who did not 
understand what was contained in the vial. The standard of care 
in nursing practice requires the presence of a competent witness 
when a medication is wasted and that the wasting of the 
medication is documented. Respondent wasted the morphine 
sulphate without a competent witness and without any 
documentation of that wasting. 
14. There is a lack of sufficient evidence that Ms. 
Mortensen needed the morphine sulphate after it had been 
prescribed and prior to Respondent's wasting of that medication. 
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Thus, there i: no basis to find that Respondent failed to 
administer the morphine sulphate to Ms. Mortensen. There is also 
a lack of sufficient evidence that Respondent had any reason to 
believe Ms. Mortensen may be the victim of actual or potential 
abuse. Thus, there is no basis to find that Respondent failed to 
report any such abuse. 
15. Respondent possessed Ms. Mortensen's morphine sulphate 
in his home and 1 1 e failed to Ie 1 i v ei: t:i 1 at pi escr: :i bed i i ledicat:i on 
to the Beckstroms. That medication should have been available at 
the Beckstrom' s hoi ne a JI i :i t:l n is accessible t : > ai ly :i n 1:1 : : E> E a s i i: id gl it 
have been subsequently needed for Ms. Mortensen. Based on the 
substantial and more credible evidence presented, both Respondent 
and the Beckstroms understood that the latter would not 
administer that controlled substance to Ms. Mortensen. 
CONCL 0 S I O N S I 11? I i is Ii 1 
The Division contends Respondent has engaged in 
unprofessional and unlawfi i] c o n d u c t ;I.I:LCIL . • is stat^^s 
and a rule which governs the practice of nursing. The Division 
i n :i t :i a ] ] ] a s s e r t s R e s p o n d e n t :i n tp r o p e r ] y r e t a :i n e d I "I s M o i: t e n s e i l' s 
medication at his residence and he thus possessed that controlled 
substance outside of his responsibilities as a nurse. 
The Division next asserts Respondent was either grossly 
incompetent, grossly negligence or he engaged in a pattern of 
incompetence or negligence. Specifically, tl re Division contends 
i :> 
Respondent failed to administer the morphine sulphate to Ms. 
Mortensen, he improperly retained that medication at his home, he 
disposed of it without a proper witness and he failed to report 
that Ms. Mortensen may be an actual or potential victim of abuse. 
The Division next contends Respondent improperly retained 
the morphine sulphate intended for Ms. Mortensen and he failed to 
produce that medication for her. Finally, the Division asserts 
Respondent failed to maintain proper controls over that 
medication. 
The Division urges that Respondent's nursing practice should 
be subject to supervision and possibly restricted to certain work 
settings. The Division also suggests that Respondent be required 
to complete some remedial education and that a fine be assessed 
in this proceeding. 
Respondent contends there is a lack of any evidence that he 
has violated any statute or rule which governs his practice of 
nursing. Given the excessive dosage and concentration of the 
morphine sulphate which Respondent obtained through his efforts, 
he asserts he properly possessed the morphine sulphate at his 
home within his responsibilities as a nurse. Respondent also 
asserts the morphine sulphate was not necessary after Ms. 
Mortensen's condition had improved and there was no basis to have 
then administered that medication to her. 
Respondent further contends that, once the morphine sulphate 
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was no longer needed for Ms. Mortensen, he had a responsibility 
to waste that medication and it was wasted in the presence of a 
competent witness. Respondent asserts the morphine sulphate did 
not became Ms. Mortensen's personal property because he never 
delivered it to her. 
Re sponde n t also asserts that, as a 1 101 i le he a 11:1 I :i n 11: s e , 1 i • E 
appropriately retained the medication at his residence for a 
brief t H U H bet\»i^ ii 'M wasted I'espondent uujeR h^ II.IJ i > 
reason to believe that Ms. Mortensen was the subject of either 
actual • : :i : potei it:i a] abuse and he thus had no obligation to report 
any such abuse. Respondent argues no disciplinary action should 
be entered in this proceeding. 
§58-1-40] provides the Division may revoke, suspend, 
restrict, place on probation, issue a public or private reprimand 
to, or otherwise act i ipoi i tl le license of ai i/}< ] icensee -: 
(a) has engaged in unprofessional conduct, 
as defined by statute or rule under this title; 
(b) . . . has engaged in unlawful conduct as defined 
by statute under this title .. 
§58 1 503 (2) gei lei al I y defii les i u iprofessioi lal condi ict to 
include: 
(a) violating . . . any statute, rule, or 
order regulating an occupation or profession 
under this title; 
(g) practicing . . . an occupation or 
profession regulated under this title through 
gross incompetence, gross negligence, or a 
pattern of incompetency or negligence. 
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§58-31b-502 specifically defines unprofessional conduct in the 
practice of nursing to include: 
(5) unlawfully obtaining, possessing, or 
using any prescription drug or illicit drug; 
(7) unauthorized taking or personal use of 
a patient's personal property. 
Unprofessional conduct relative to controlled substances is 
defined by rule. Specifically, R156-37-502 (4) provides such 
unprofessional conduct includes: 
(4) failing to maintain controls over 
controlled substances which would be 
considered by a prudent practitioner to be 
effective against diversion, theft, or 
shortage of controlled substances. . .. 
§58-37-8(2) (a) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act provides it 
is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and 
intentionally to possess or use± a controlled 
substance, unless it was obtained under a 
valid prescription or order, directly from a 
practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise 
authorized by this chapter. 
Respondent lawfully obtained the morphine sulphate from B & H 
Pharmacy. However, Respondent engaged in both unprofessional and 
unlawful conduct - violative of §58-31b-502 (5) and §58-37-
8(2) (a) (i) - when he unlawfully possessed that prescribed 
controlled substance in his home and he failed to deliver that 
medication to the Beckstrom's home. 
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Respondent also engaged in unprofessional conduct 
violative of §58-31b-502 (7) A/1len he took Ms. Mortensen's 
prescribed medication and possessed the morphine sulphate in his 
home. Respondent violated the applicable standard of care because 
he failed to duly deliver that medication to the Beckstroms. 
Re sponde nt also thus engaged i n unp r o fessional c o i idi I c t: a s d e £ 11 i e d 
by §58-1-501(2)(a). 
Tl le Boar d tl i i is c :>i i ::] i ides Coi n its I a i I :i 111 : f tl: i E • ] i ill y ] , 
2 002 Petition have been established by a preponderance of the 
evideno • M> :eordi.nq Iy\ Hi^ Board finds mid concludes a proper 
factual and legal basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction 
as to Respondent's nursing license. 
The Board finds and concludes M s . Mortensen did not need tlle 
medication after it had been prescribed. Accordingly, no factual 
basis exists that Respondent failed I u idminiDL^L necessary 
medication to Ms. Mortensen. There is a lack of sufficient 
evidence that l^\sponden^ had ,iir; reason I " ," believe that Ms. 
Mortensen may be a victim of actual or potential abuse. 
Accordingly, there is no evidence that Respondent failed to 
report any such abuse and he did not violate § 76- 1 111, 
which provides: 
Any person, Lii<iiluding but not limited to, a 
. . . nurse . . . who has reason to believe 
that any disabled or elder adult has been the 
subject of abuse, emotional or psychological 
abuse, neglect, or exploitation shall 
immediately notify the nearest peace officer, 
law enforcement agency, or local office of 
Adult Protective Services within the 
Department of Human Services, Division of 
Aging and Adult Services. 
Respondent inappropriately kept the morphine sulphate at his 
home and he disposed of that controlled substance without a 
competent witness and any documentation. However, the Board finds 
and concludes that such conduct - standing alone - fails to 
establish a violation of §58-1-502(2)(g) because it does not 
represent either gross negligence, gross incompetence or a pattern 
of incompetency or negligence. Accordingly, the Board finds and 
concludes there is a lack of sufficient evidence that Respondent 
violated Count II of the July 1, 2002 Petition. 
The Board finds and concludes there is a lack of sufficient 
evidence to establish Respondent violated R156-37-502 (4) . That 
rule governs a failure of a practitioner to maintain controls 
over controlled substances in an institutional setting as to 
effectively prevent the diversion, theft or shortage of such 
substances. 
R156-37-502(4) does not strictly apply in a home health care 
setting and the fact that Respondent possessed the morphine 
sulphate in his home and he wasted that medication without a 
competent witness and proper documentation does not establish a 
violation of that rule. Accordingly, the Board finds and 
concludes there is a lack of sufficient evidence that Respondent 
violated Count IV of the July 4, 2002 Petition. 
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Respondent failed to exercise good judgment when he elected 
to retain the morphine sulphate in his home rather than deliver 
that medication to the Beckstroms. Respondent simply failed to 
recognize that Ms. Mortensen's medication should have been 
available at the Beckstrom's home if Ms. Mortensen's condition 
again deteriorated as to subsequently warrant the use f tlle 
Duragesic patches and the morphine sulphate for breakthrough 
pain. 
The Board acknowledges that the quantity of morphine 
sulphate wh:i ch Respondei mately obtained c01 i] d be 
potentially lethal if inappropriately administered. 
Nevertheless, Respondent knew the Beckstroms would not administer 
the morphine sulphate to Ms. Mortensen, he should have delivered 
that medication to the Beckstroms and Respondent failed to do so 
in his zealous attempts t: : • : bta11 1 ai i :I 11 :n • E i :i exclusively coi 11ro 1 
access to that medication. 
The Board does i lot doi ibt tl lat Respondent acted w:i th good 
intentions. Significantly, there is no evidence of any potential 
or actual injury caused by Respondent's misconduct. To the 
contrary, Respondent generally provided good nursing care to Ms. 
Mortensen during the brief time that he was her home health care 
nurse. 
The Board concludes Respondent's misconduct represents an 
isolated i i i ::i • :ie i: it: 
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Respondent would repeat that conduct with another patient in a 
home health care setting. Moreover, Respondent has not been 
previously subject to any disciplinary licensure action. 
Accordingly, the Board finds and concludes the Recommended Order 
set forth below is a sufficient admonishment to Respondent based 
on the rather unique facts of this case. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent be publicly 
reprimanded for the unprofessional and unlawful conduct set forth 
herein. Respondent shall abstain from such conduct in the future 
and assure that medications prescribed for any of his patients in 
a home health care setting are maintained in their home for 
administration to the patient as may be warranted. 
On behalf of the Board of Nursing, I hereby certify the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended 
Order were submitted to W. Ray Walker, Regulatory and Compliance 
Officer for the Division^of Occupational and Professional 




BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN IHE MATTER OF THE REQUES ' • FINDINGS OF FACT , 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and 
I RECOMMENDED ORDER 
W. Scott Jepson 
PETITIONER IXM'L 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter came before the Dm;n-!::
 : • - - i>"imerce ("Depai ti i lent") i ipoi 1 a 
request for agency review filed by W. Scott Jepson ("Petitioner") following an order of 
the Division of Oivnpaln null mini Professional Licensing ("i •• •< .: luding that 
Petitioner had engaged in unprofessional and unlawful conduct. 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING R EVIEW 
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Ad f l f \P VA Ml ill i 'otic Ann , § 63-46b .. iah 
Administrative Code, Rl51-46b-12. 
ISSUES REVIEWED 
1 >id the Division properly interpret and apply controlling statutes and 
rules? 
Did the Division err in finding that Petitioner disposed of the morphine 
sulphate prescribed for a home healf -^
 : r ». •• .>ss an(j 
documentation? 
3. Did the presiding officer abuse his discretion in (a) excluding an exhibit 
offered by Petitioner concerning the standard of care and (b) allowing the testimony of an 
expert witness? 
4. Is public reprimand a proper sanction where Petitioner did not intend to 
harm the patient, and the patient was not in fact harmed by not having the controlled 
substance available at her residence? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner is a licensed registered nurse employed as a home health care 
nurse for First Choice Home Health ("First Choice"). 
2. The appropriate standard of care for home health nurses is to maintain 
medications prescribed for patients at the patients' homes 
3. On April 5, 2002, Petitioner began providing nursing care to Hazel 
Mortensen, an elderly disabled adult. Ms. Mortensen had been living with her daughter 
and son in law, Karen and Garth Beckstrom. 
4. On April 11, 2002, Petitioner determined that Ms. Mortensen was unable 
to swallow her medications. Petitioner contacted Dr. Erik Hogenson, Ms. Mortensen's 
primary care physician, to obtain alternate pain management medication. Based on 
Petitioner's assessment of Ms. Mortensen, Dr. Hogenson prescribed Duragesic patches, a 
Schedule II controlled substance containing fentanyl, and injectable morphine sulphate, 
also a Schedule II controlled substance. 
5. Petitioner and Mr. Beckstrom obtained the prescriptions from Dr. 
Hogenson's office and proceeded to a pharmacy to obtain the medications. The 
pharmacist filled the Duragesic patches, and Mr. Beckstrom later took that medication 
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home. However, the injectable morphine sulphate was not available at the pharmacy. 
Petitioner attempted to locate the morphine sulphate at other pharmacies but was unable 
to obtain the morphine prescription in the multi-unit dosage as prescnbed by Dr. 
Hogenson. 
6. Petitioner eventually found a pharmacy that could fill the prescription in a 
different dosage. Petitioner returned to Dr. Hogenson's office and obtained a new 
prescription from Dr. James Rose for the morphine sulphate. Petitioner had the new 
prescription filled at approximately 8:00 p.m. on April 11, 2002, after which he 
proceeded to his home. 
7. The evidence is conflicting as to whether there was communication 
between Petitioner and the Beckstroms that evening after Petitioner had obtained the 
morphine sulphate. Petitioner left his residence in the morning on April 12, 2002, 
leaving the morphine sulphate behind while he checked on other patients. Ms. 
Mortensen's condition had improved significantly that morning, and the Beckstroms thus 
believed that the morphine sulphate was no longer necessary. Mr. Beckstrom left a 
telephone message for Petitioner, instructing him not to have the morphine sulphate 
prescription filled if he had not yet obtained that medication for Ms. Mortensen. 
8. Petitioner had not received the message before he arrived at the Beckstrom 
home approximately fifteen (15) minutes later without the medication. He informed the 
Beckstroms that he had obtained the morphine sulphate but had left it at his home. Mr. 
Beckstrom paid Petitioner for the medication. 
9. Petitioner returned to the Beckstrom home on April 13, 2002. Mrs. 
Beckstrom inquired whether Petitioner had brought the morphine sulphate with him. 
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Petitioner responded that he could not provide the medication to them because it would 
be an illegal distribution of a controlled substance and that he had destroyed the 
medication. The Beckstroms had expected Petitioner to leave the medication at their 
home so that it would be available if Ms. Mortensen later needed it and another home 
health nurse could administer it to her. 
10. Petitioner elected to dispose of the morphine sulphate in his residence, and 
did so in front of a witness, Mr. John Branin. However, Petitioner did not document the 
disposal because First Choice did not have any forms regarding wasting of medications. 
11. First Choice was aware of Petitioner's handling of the morphine sulphate. 
After conducting its own investigation, First Choice reported the incident to the Division 
which subsequently filed a Petition against Petitioner alleging the following: 
Count I. Petitioner possessed controlled substances outside of his 
responsibilities as a nurse. Therefore, Petitioner engaged in unlawful and 
unprofessional conduct as defined in Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37-
8(2)(a)(l), 58-31b-502(5) and 58-l-501(2)(a). 
Count II. Petitioner failed to administer a medication to his patient as 
prescribed by a physician. Petitioner maintained a patient's narcotics 
medication at his residence and he disposed of a controlled substance 
without a proper witness as is standard practice in nursing. Petitioner 
failed to report his suspicion that the patient may be a victim of abuse or 
potential abuse per his legal obligation in Utah Code Annotated § 76-
11.1(1). Therefore Petitioner engaged in unprofessional conduct as 
defined in Utah Code Annotated § 58-l-502(2)(g). 
Count III. Petitioner failed to produce a medication he purchased for a 
patient. Therefore, Petitioner engaged in unprofessional conduct as 
defined in Utah Code Annotated § 58-31b-502(7). 
Count IV. Petitioner maintained a controlled substance at his home and he 
destroyed the medication without a witness. Therefore, Petitioner engaged 
in unprofessional conduct as defined in Utah Administrative Code R156-
37-502(4). 
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12. A hearing was conducted on April 23 and May 30, 2003, before the Board. 
The Board concluded that Counts I and III were established but it dismissed Counts II 
and IV. The Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law were adopted by the 
Division Director's designee on June 16, 2003, and an Order was specifying a public 
reprimand of Petitioner.1 
13. On July 15, 2003, Petitioner filed a timely request for agency review. In 
addition, Petitioner requested an order staying the enforcement of the Division's Order 
and requested oral argument. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Applicable Laws and Rules 
1. The Division may revoke, suspend or otherwise sanction the license of any 
licensee who engages in unlawful or unprofessional conduct as defined by statute or rule 
under Title 58 of the Utah Code. Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-401 (2)(a) and (b). Unlawful 
and unprofessional conduct are defined in vanous statutory provisions as indicated 
below. 
2. The Utah Controlled Substances Act ("C/S Act") makes it unlawful for 
anyone to knowingly and intentionally possess a controlled substance unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) provides: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner 
while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise 
authorized by this chapter; 
1
 References in these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Division's findings or Division's 
conclusions mean the Board's findings and conclusions of law, as adopted by the Division. 
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(Emphasis added). "An ultimate user, or any person who possesses any controlled 
substance pursuant to a lawful order of a practitioner" is "not required to obtain a license 
and may lawfully possess controlled substances". Subsection 58-37-6(2)(c)(iii). 
3. The term "unprofessional conduct" has been defined in various sections of 
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing Act and by Division rule, Title 
58 of the Utah Code. Under the following pertinent provisions, unprofessional conduct 
has been defined to include: 
• violating.. .any statute, rule, or order regulating an occupation 
under this title - Section 58-l-501(2)(a); 
• for a nurse to unlawfully obtain, possess or use any prescription 
drug or illicit drug - Section 58-31b-502(5); 
• for a nurse, the "unauthorized taking or personal use of a patient's 
personal property"- Subsection 58-31b-502(7); and 
• "failing to maintain controls over controlled substances which 
would be considered by a prudent practitioner to be effective 
against diversion, theft, or shortage of controlled substances" -
Utah Admin. Code, R156-37-502(4).2 
B. Division's Order 
4. Although the Division acknowledged that the quantity of morphine was 
potentially lethal if inappropriately administered, it found that the standard of care for 
home health nurses is to keep prescription medications at the homes of patients. The 
Division applied that standard of care to the definitions of unlawful and unprofessional 
conduct to conclude that Petitioner engaged in both unlawful and unprofessional conduct 
as follows: 
• Petitioner lawfully obtained the morphine sulphate from the pharmacy, but he 
later unlawfully possessed the medication in his home and failed to deliver it to 
the Beckstrom home, violating Subsections 58-31b-502(5) and 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). 
2
 Hereafter, this rule is refened to as Rule 502(4). 
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• Petitioner engaged in unprofessional conduct violative of Subsection 58-3 lb-
502(7) (taking of personal property), and thereby Subsection 58-l-501(2)(a) when 
he took the patient's medication home with him. 
The Division further found that Petitioner disposed of the morphine without a competent 
witness and without documentation. Nevertheless, the Division dismissed for lack of 
proof Count II (alleging violation of failure to administer medication and failure to report 
abuse) and Count IV (alleging violation of gross negligence/incompetence or pattern of 
such -+ Subsection 58-l-502(2)(g), and failure to maintain controls over controlled 
substances - Rule 502(4), and destroying the morphine without a witness). The Division 
determined that Rule 502(4) was not strictly applicable in a home health setting. It then 
considered various mitigating factors including the potential lethal quantity of morphine 
sulphate at issue and its finding that Petitioner acted with good intentions, that he caused 
no harm to the patient, and he had not previously been disciplined by the Division. 
Accordingly, the Division ordered a public reprimand and ordered Petitioner to 
henceforth maintain medications at the homes of his home health patients. 
C. Standards of Review 
5. The standards for agency review within the Department of Commerce 
correspond to those established by UAPA3, Accordingly, the Executive Director will 
apply different standards of review depending on whether the issue is one of fact, law, or 
legal discretion. WWC Holding Co., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 2001 UT 23, % 7, 
44P.3d714. 
6. The party challenging an agency's findings of fact must show that the 
finding is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record. Section 63-46b-l 6(4)(g). The burden remains upon the party challenging the 
3
 Utah Admin. Code, R151-46b-12(7). 
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facts to marshal all of the evidence in support of the decision and to show that despite 
such evidence, the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Utah Admin. Code 
R\5\-46bA2Q)(c); First Nat'l Bank v. County Bel Of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 
(Utah 1990). The failure to so marshal the evidence permits the Executive Director to 
accept the findings of fact made by the Division as conclusive. Utah Admin. Code R151-
46b-12(3)(c); Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
7. When reviewing the Division's interpretation of general questions of law, 
the Executive Director applies a correction-of-error standard, granting no deference to the 
Division's decisions. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581, 
587-88 (Utah 1991). However, on matters of ultimate fact, mixed findings of fact and 
law, and the Division's interpretation of statutory law it is empowered to administer, the 
Division's decisions are reviewed for reasonableness. Associated Gen. Contrs. v. Bd. of 
Oil Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, % 18, 38 P.3d 291. Thus, when the Division has 
specialized knowledge that is helpful in interpreting a statute, the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated: 
[I]nstances involving "ultimate facts, mixed findings of fact and law, and 
[an agency's] interpretation of the . . . statutory law it is empowered to 
administer" are limited to situations where the agency has been granted 
explicit or implicit discretion under the statute, where the agency 
possesses expertise concerning the operative provisions at issue, or where 
the agency is otherwise in a better position than the courts to assess the 
law due to its experience with the relevant subject matter. 
Id. (emphasis added, citations omitted). "Generally, an agency's interpretation of its own 
rules, especially where the Legislature has granted the agency discretion in that area, is 
subject to deference by a reviewing court." State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). The Utah Supreme Court has also applied a reasonableness standard to the 
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Division's determination of whether a licensee has engaged in unprofessional conduct. 
Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, pp. 127-128 (Utah 1983). Finally, whether the 
sanction of public reprimand is appropriate under the circumstances of this case is also 
reviewed for reasonableness. Johnson-Bowles v. Division of Sec., 829 P.2d 101, 114 
(Utah App.)> cert denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
D. Petitioner's Challenges 
8. Petitionees challenges to the Division's interpretation and application of 
the laws and rules in this case are numerous, duplicative, and in some cases difficult to 
discern. Therefore, in these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended 
Order, the twenty-two points Petitioner raises as his challenges to the Division's Order 
will be distilled to the essential issues. 
(a) Antithetic Allegations: 
9. Petitioner argues that the Division's initial petition contained "antithetic 
allegations", and that he was charged with both failing to maintain effective controls over 
the morphine sulphate under Count IV and failing to relinquish control over the morphine 
in Counts I & III. Even if such allegations were in fact conflicting and improper, no such 
problem exists in the final order of the Division. The Division expressly concluded that 
Petitioner had not violated Rule 502(4) and dismissed the charges in Count IV.4 Because 
the Division's final order is the subject of this agency review, and not the allegations in 
the petition, the argument as to antithetic allegations is not pertinent to this review. 
(b) Application of Rule 502(4): 
Petitioner mischaractenzes the Division's conclusions when he represents that the Division found uhe 
obeyed Rule 156 by maintaining control." A conclusion that Petitioner did not violate Rule 502(4) is not 
the same as a conclusion that he obeyed that Subsection, particularly in light of the next paragraph in the 
Division's findings of facts and conclusions of law, which state that the Subsection does not apply to home 
health settings. 
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10. Petitioner challenges the Division's conclusions that Rule 502(4) does not 
apply to home health nurses. In this case, the Division was in a better position than the 
Executive Director to give effect to the regulatory objective to be achieved by Rule 
502(4). The State Legislature explicitly gave the Division the power to adopt rules 
identifying and defining activities that constitute "unprofessional conduct" which may 
form the basis for disciplinary actions. See Utah Code Ann. §58-1-501 ("'unprofessional 
conduct' means conduct.. .definedi as unprofessional conduct, under this title or under any j 
rule adopted under this title"). Pursuant to such authority, the Division drafted and later 
adopted Rule 502(4), defining the failure to maintain controls over controlled substances 
as unprofessional conduct. Therefore, as the agency with explicit discretion to define 
unprofessional conduct and as the drafter of Rule 502(4), the Division was clearly in a 
better position than the Executive Director to interpret that Subsection. See Garcia, at 
512. Thus, the Division's interpretation of Rule 502(4) should be reviewed for 
reasonableness. 
11. The Division's interpretation of Rule 502(4) and the resulting conclusion 
that the Rule does not apply to home health nurses is reasonable. The environment in a 
patient's home is different from that in an institution. In an institutional setting, 
individuals who are on the premises for health care services, those who accompany them, 
vendors, maintenance staff and the general public could potentially come into contact 
with an unsecured controlled substance. Therefore, security measures would be 
appropriate in such a setting to keep controlled substances in a designated area where 
only authorized personnel can access them. In a home health care setting, however, the 
danger of public access is practically non-existent. The patient or his/her caregivers 
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control access to the home and to the medications in the home. Therefore, it is not 
unreasonable for the Division to conclude that Rule 502(4) does not apply to home health 
care situations. 
(c) Standard of Care: 
12. Even if Rule 502(4) applied to home health nurses, however, pursuant to 
that Rule, the level of controls to be maintained in a particular situation is determined by 
what "would be considered by a prudent practitioner to be effective against diversion, 
theft, or shortage of controlled substances". The Board determined that a reasonably 
prudent nurse would not consider taking home a patient's medication an effective means 
of preventing diversion, theft, or shortage of controlled substance, but would instead be 
concerned about the possible danger that the patient who needs her medication cannot 
access it. Thus, the Board found that the standard of care for a home health nurse was to 
keep medications prescribed for a patient at the patient's home. 
13. It is clear from Petitioner's submissions that he does not agree with the 
Board's finding of the standard of care. However, Petitioner has failed to adequately 
challenge that finding. What is the appropriate standard of care for a specific profession 
is a finding of fact. Vance at pp. 127-128 (Utah 1983). Petitioner has failed to marshal 
the evidence in favor of the finding of the standard of care for home health nurses and to 
the show that despite that evidence, the finding is not supported by substantial evidence. 
Utah Admin. Code, R151-46b-12(3)(c);F/r^A^a/75a^ at 1165. Instead, Petitioner has 
reviewed the evidence in favor of his position. Therefore, the Executive Director may 
accept the Division's finding of fact regarding the standard of care as conclusive. 
Subsection R151-46b-12(3)(c); Campbell at 808. 
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14. Moreover, there is substantial evidence in the record that the standard of 
care is to maintain prescription medications at the patient's home. Elizabeth Baker, who 
had more than twelve years of experience as a home health nurse, testified that 
prescription medications should be kept at the home of a patient, that the home health 
nurse has a duty to educate the patient and her caregivers about controlled substances, 
and that the patient's caregivers are responsible for the security of the medications. Dr. 
Eric Hogenson testified that the morphine prescribed for Ms. Mortensen should have 
been available for more than one episode, that it should have been kept at the patient's 
home, and that he did not think that the Beckstroms would attempt to administer it to Ms. 
Mortensen. Petitioner also believed that the Beckstroms would comply with any 
instructions he gave regarding Ms. Mortensen's medications. Dr. Hogenson stated that 
the morphine Petitioner ultimately obtained for Ms. Mortensen was not a shocking 
amount. Although Dr. Hogenson's practice is to prescribe morphine pills for his home 
health patients, on this occasion, he relied upon Petitioner's assessment and 
recommendation that injectable morphine would be appropriate to meet Ms. Mortensen's 
needs. Dr. James Rose testified that he wrote a subsequent prescription for Ms. 
Mortensen at Petitioner's request. Dr. Rose prescribed this "potent substance" with the 
understanding that a registered nurse would administer the morphine. There was also 
testimony that the Beckstroms could have obtained the morphine prescription themselves 
and maintained it at their home for future administration by a nurse. 
15. It is true that Petitioner presented opposing evidence through expert 
witnesses, including a nurse who stated that the standard of care was not to leave the 
morphine at the patient's home, and two doctors who were also concerned about the 
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strength of the medication and the danger of leaving it at the Beckstrom home. However, 
there was substantial evidence on the Division's side as noted above, and the Executive 
Director is not in a position to substitute her judgment for that of the Board which has 
expertise in nursing and can better judge the testimony presented in light of their 
knowledge, training and experience in nursing. The Utah Court of Appeals has stated: 
We are in no position to second guess the detailed findings of the ALJ 
which were adopted by the Board. It is not our role to judge the relative 
i credibility of witnesses. In undertaking such a review, this court will not 
substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even 
though we may have come to a different conclusion had the case come 
before us for de novo review. It is the province of the Board, not appellate 
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences 
can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the 
inferences. 
Albertsons Inc. v. Department ofEmp. Sec. et al, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah App. 1993) 
(citations omitted). 
16. Although the morphine was in a potentially lethal dose, Petitioner could 
have educated the family about its dangers and could have instructed the family not to 
attempt to administer it to Ms. Mortensen themselves. There was no evidence presented 
to suspect that the Beckstroms would disregard such instruction, and Petitioner has not 
contested the Division's Finding #15 that the Beckstroms would not administer the 
controlled substance to Ms. Mortensen. 
(d) Standard of Care Is Enforceable Even Though Not Yet In Writing: 
17. Petitioner complains that there is no statute, rule or other written standard 
stating that a home health nurse cannot take a patient's controlled substances home. 
However, the standard is enforceable even though it is not written, because: 
• The subject of professional performance is too comprehensive to 
be codified in detail. 
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• Members of a profession can properly be held to understand its 
standards of performance. 
• Members of the same profession in the process of administrative 
adjudication will interpret standards of performance. 
Vance, at p. 129. In Vance, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the general statutory 
standard of "unprofessional conduct" even though the Osteopathic Committee had not 
previously defined unprofessional conduct by published rules. The Court found it 
relevant that "the standard of 'unprofessional conduct' could be applied by expert 
professionals to judge another professional's conduct", and stated that certified 
professionals "could be held to a higher standard of awareness of the profession's 
unmodified standards in the treatment of patients...." Id. at 129. See also In re Topik, 
761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert denied, 113 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
18. Pursuant to the authority in Vance therefore, the standard of care as to 
medications prescribed for home health care patients need not be written in a statute or 
rule in order to be enforceable and effective against a home health nurse who violates that 
standard. As discussed above, there was substantial evidence presented regarding the 
standard of care, and the Board is comprised of several licensed nursing professionals 
who are themselves familiar with the standards of care for nurses. 
(e) Unlawful and Unprofessional Conduct: 
19. Even though Petitioner is correct that initially he lawfully obtained the 
morphine prescription, because the proper standard of care for home health nurses is to 
keep controlled substances within the dominion and control of the patient, Petitioner's 
conduct in taking the morphine home violated the unlawful possession and unauthorized 
taking statutes, and accordingly, the unprofessional conduct statutes (Subsections 58-1-
501(2), 58-37-8(2)(a)(l), 58-31b-502(5) and (7)). Petitioner admits that he obtained the 
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morphine sulphate for Ms. Mortensen's use, that he took the medication to his home 
where other nurses could not access it if she needed it without having to first locate him, 
kept it there against the patient's and her family's wishes, and later destroyed it. These 
facts clearly meet the definition of "possession" and "taking". 
20. "Possession" and "use" are jointly defined in the C/S Act as the 
"ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining..." of 
controlled substances, and "it is sufficient if it is shown that the person... had the-ability 
and intent to exercise dominion and control over it". Subsection 58-37-2(l)(dd). 
Petitioner was not the ultimate user of the morphine, and although he originally lawfully 
obtained it for Ms. Mortensen's use, he never administered it to her and kept it from her 
against her family's wishes and against the proper standard of care for home health 
nurses. Subsection 58-37-6(2)(c)(iii). Thus, his maintaining the morphine was no longer 
lawful, and he unlawfully possessed it by virtue of the fact that he had the ability and 
intent to exercise dominion and control over it. Subsections 58-37-8(2) and 58-37-
(2)(l)(dd). 
21. By such exercise of dominion and control over the morphine, Petitioner 
also engaged in the unauthorized taking of the morphine. The term "taking" is not 
defined in either the Nurse Act or the C/S Act. However, the Black's Law Dictionary 
definition of "taking" indicates that this term is akin to the C/S Act's definition of 
"possession". A "taking" is "the act of laying hold upon an article, with or without 
removing the same. It implies a transfer of possession, dominion, or control" Black's 
Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, at p. 1626. 
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22. Petitioner argues that possession is necessary for a taking, reasoning that 
because Ms. Mortensen never had possession of the morphine, he could not have been 
guilty of a "taking" or a transfer of possession under Utah Code Ann. § 58-3 lb-502(7). 
However, case law cited by Petitioner supports the conclusion that a taking may be found 
if the person from whom something is taken had the right of possession', she need not 
have physical possession: 
The third essential elementi in the crime of larceny is that the thing taken 
and carried away should be the property of another. That is, someone 
other than the taker must have in the thing taken a general or special 
property right which is invaded by the trespass committed in the taking. 
Considered as an element of larceny, "ownership' ' and "possession" may 
be regarded as synonymous terms; for one who has the right of possession 
as against the thief is, so far as the latter is concerned, the owner. Since 
appellant acquired possession of the money by fraud and chicanery, he 
held it all the while without right, and as against him Mrs. Benoit had the 
right of possession. It is of no consequence that the legal title to the bills 
was in the county. 
People v. Edwards, 72 Cal. App. 102, 236 P. 944 (Ca. 2d App. Dist. 1925) (emphasis 
added; citations omitted). 
23. It is clear that Ms. Mortensen had the right of possession of the morphine. 
The prescription was written for her. Had Petitioner not picked up the prescription, the 
Beckstroms would have done so and Ms. Mortensen would have had physical possession. 
Therefore, Petitioner's argument that Ms. Mortensen did not have physical possession is 
not valid. The Division's conclusions that Petitioner unlawfully possessed and engaged 
in the unauthorized taking of the morphine such that he engaged in unlawful and 
unprofessional conduct are reasonable, correct and should be upheld. Petitioner was not 
the ultimate user, he had no authority to keep the medication from the patient (per the 
standard of care), and he maintained possession and control of the medication. 
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(f) Petitioner's Claims That He Complied with Rule 502(4): 
24. Petitioner also maintains that his conduct does not constitute the unlawful 
possession or unauthorized taking of a controlled substance because at all times he 
complied with Rule 502(4). However, Petitioner's arguments fail on the same grounds 
that he uses to challenge the Division's decision. Rule 502(4) does not specifically state 
that it applies to home health nurses; nor does it specifically state that a home health 
nurse can take a patient's prescription medication home as a means of maintaining 
appropriate controls over the medication. Petitioner has not cited any other statute, rule 
or other writing that specifically authorizes him to take the medication home. Petitioner 
is actually arguing that the appropriate standard of care is to keep the morphine from a 
patient's home under Rule 502(4), but the Board concluded otherwise as has been 
addressed above. 
(g) Rulemaking Act and Ex Post Facto Laws: 
25. Petitioner claims that the Division failed to follow Rule 502(4), 
improperly restricted the applicability of that Subsection without complying with 
rulemaking requirements, and created new crimes and ex post facto laws. He further 
maintains that the Division's interpretation improperly requires home health nurses to 
engage in the illegal distribution of medications to the family members of a patient. 
These additional arguments stem from Petitioner's incorrect position that the Division 
improperly interpreted Rule 502(4). Because that has been addressed above, it is not 
necessary to go into any detail in addressing these additional arguments. 
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26. There is no validity to Petitioner's argument that the Division violated the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act by creating new laws that are being applied retroactively. 
Rather, as concluded above, the Board reasonably interpreted existing statutes and rules 
regarding unprofessional conduct and determined the proper standard of care. 
Furthermore, the protection against ex post facto laws applies only to criminal 
punishment, not civil remedies such as professional licensing disciplinary sanctions. See 
In the Matter of the Discipline of Peter M. Ennenga, 2001UT 111, 1ffi 18, 21, 37 P.3d 
1150 (holding that sanctions resulting from attorney discipline proceedings are civil 
remedies, not criminal punishments subject to the prohibition against ex post facto laws). 
(h) Witness to Disposal of Morphine: 
27. The Division found that Petitioner disposed of the morphine without a 
competent witness who understood what was contained in the vial and without adequate 
documentation. It further found that the standard of care for nurses is to dispose of 
medication in the presence of a competent witness and with proper documentation. 
Petitioner states that there was a competent witness, and that the petition made no 
allegation regarding lack of documentation. Whether there is substantial evidence in the 
record for these two findings is not relevant upon agency review, because the record 
indicates that the petition originally filed against Petitioner did not allege any failure to 
document and because the charges based upon these findings, namely, Counts II and IV, 
were dismissed. Thus, the findings were not relevant to the final Order of the Division. 
That the Division's Order contained these findings is harmless error. 
28. An error is "harmless" if it is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. Morton 
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Int% Inc. v. State Tax Cornm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991). Regardless of the 
Division's findings regarding the disposal of the morphine, the Division dismissed 
Counts II and IV in the petition which contained allegations regarding that issue. The 
Division's decision regarding Counts I and III, however, did not relate to how the 
medication was destroyed. As recommended previously, the Division should be upheld 
on its conclusions that Counts I and III were established, and the findings about the 
disposal do not affect that outcome. 
(i) Challenges As to Abuse of Discretion: 
29. Petitioner states that the presiding officer abused his discretion in (a) 
admitting the testimony of Dr. Baker and (b) failing to admit an exhibit he offered, a 
document entitled "Security of Other Medications and Supplies". The standard of review 
as to whether evidence was properly admitted at a hearing is abuse of discretion or 
reasonableness. Mule-hide Products Co. v. White, 2002 App 1, f 12, 40 P.3d 1155. The 
exhibit was published on the web site of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations on its "Home Care Page" and was offered by Petitioner to show 
the standard of practice for home health nurses. However, the content of the exhibit 
clearly shows that it does not apply to home health care settings but applies to an 
institutional setting. The exhibit refers to public access, patient waiting areas, patient 
examination rooms, and private offices. Thus, the presiding officer's decision to exclude 
the document to prove the standards in a home health setting was reasonable and he did 
not abuse his discretion in excluding the exhibit. 
30. Admitting Ms. Baker as an expert witness was also reasonable. Ms. Baker 
was introduced by the Division as an expert witness in the Division's Expert Witness 
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Disclosure dated March 11, 2003. At the hearing, the Division questioned her about her 
qualifications and then went on to question her about her opinions on the issues in the 
case. Petitioner's counsel objected to a question posed to her by the Division, stating that 
it was a legal question. The presiding officer permitted the question as appropriate for an 
expert witness. Petitioner's counsel at first did not agree with that assessment, but then 
appeared to accept that Ms. Baker was in fact being offered and was testifying as an 
expert witness, i He stated, "[s]he was not offered, but I guess she is now, as a qualified 
expert witness on home health nurse." Thereafter, Petitioner did not attempt to voir dire 
the witness, object to her qualifications or otherwise notify the presiding officer that he 
had any concerns that Ms. Baker was testifying as an expert witness. Because of 
Petitioner's failure to make an objection at the hearing, he cannot raise that issue now on 
agency review. A "party must raise an objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its 
right to litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings." Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 
P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
(j) Other Issues: 
31. Petitioner raises other issues such as the presiding officer allegedly falsely 
assured him that there would be no decision by the Board on the issue of a "taking" and 
that the Board engaged in gender bias against him. Howe\ er, Petitioner has not 
adequately briefed these issues, nor did he properly preserve them for agency review. 
Brinkerhoff dX p. 589. Therefore, the Executive Director should decline to consider them. 
E. Propriety of Sanction 
32. Although the Division has broad discretion under Subsection 58-1-401 to 
determine the appropriate sanction against Petitioner's license for his violations of law, a 
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review of the mitigating factors indicates that a private reprimand with a requirement that 
Petitioner notify his employers of the reprimand is a more appropriate sanction in this 
case. The Beckstroms testified that Petitioner was a good nurse and that he took 
appropriate care of Ms. Mortensen; the only concern they had was that the morphine was 
not available for Ms. Mortensen if she later needed it. The Division found that Petitioner 
had no intention to injure Ms. Mortensen, and she was not in fact injured; she did not 
need the morphine that he kept and later destroyed. At all times, his intentions were to 
comply with the law and the standard of care for home health nurses, not to violate them. 
Furthermore, Petitioner has no record of any prior disciplinary actions during his many 
years as a licensed registered nurse. Therefore, it is recommended that the sanction of 
public reprimand by modified as set forth in these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Recommended Order. 
F. Petitioner's Submissions 
33. Throughout his memoranda, Counsel for Petitioner raises serious 
and improper charges of misconduct against the Division and the Board, including 
statements such as "they make stuff up as they go" and they think they are "above 
the law". Petitioner also requests that sanctions and fines be imposed against the 
Division and the Board. Petitioner, however, has cited no provision of UAPA that 
would permit the Executive Director to impose such sanctions and fines. 
Furthermore, a review of the record in this case indicates no ill will or misconduct 
by the Division or the Board. What the record indicates is that the Division and 
the Board took actions they found necessary to protect the public, as they are 
required to do under the law. Utah Code Ann. § 13-1-1. 
21 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing finding that Petitioner engaged in unprofessional and unlawful 
conduct should be affirmed. 
However, the sanction of public reprimand should be modified to a private 
reprimand for unprofessional and unlawful conduct as established in this case. In 
addition, within 30 days of this Order on Review, Petitioner shall notify his current 
employer of the private reprimand, and thereafter any future employers until five years 
after this Order on Review. Respondent shall deliver controlled substances prescribed for 
his home health patients to the patients' home and shall maintain them there for 
administration to patients as may be warranted. 
DATED this £$**- day of July, 2004. 
Masuda Medcalf 
Administrative Law Judge 
JLO^\ 
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BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE \ m W * 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
<? 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF 
W. Scott Jepson 
PETITIONER 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
DOPE 
Because the parties have more than adequately briefed the issues in this case, 
pursuant to her discretion in Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12(4) and Utah Admin. Code, 
Rl 51-46b-12(6), the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce hereby denies 
Petitioner's request for oral argument. 
The Order Granting Stay previously issued in this matter is lifted. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order in this 
matter are ratified and adopted by the Executive Director. The decision of the Division 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing concluding that Petitioner engaged in 
unprofessional and unlawful conduct is hereby affirmed. 
However, the Division's sanction of public reprimand is hereby modified to a 
private reprimand for unprofessional and unlawful conduct as established in this case. In 
addition, within 30 days of this Order on Review, Petitioner shall notify his current 
employer of the private reprimand, and thereafter any future employers until five years 
after this Order on Review. Respondent shall deliver controlled substances prescribed for 
his home health patients to the patient's home and shall maintain them there for 
administration to the patient as may be warranted. 
DATED this 00 day of July, 2004. 
Klarice A. Bachman, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review 
with the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. 
Any Petition for Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 
63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated. In the alternative, but not required in order to exhaust 
administrative remedies, reconsideration may be requested pursuant to Bourgeous v. 
Department of Commerce, et aL, 981 P.2d 414 (Utah App. 1999) within 20 days after the 
date of this Order on Review pursuant to Section 63-46b-13. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the,-4?^teay of July, 2004, the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Review 
by certified and first class mail, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to: 
Arron F. Jepson 
10660 South 540 East 
Sandy UT 84070 
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to: 
J. Craig Jackson, Director 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Karl Perry, Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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